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Summary findings
Grootaert  and Braithwaite compare poverty in three  social transfers (other than pensions) or other nonearned
Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Hungary,  and  income. But through  sheer mass, the largest group of
Poland) with poverty in three countries of the former  poor people is the working poor - especially workers
Soviet Union (Estonia, Kyrgyz Republic, and Russia).  with little education (primary education or less) or
They find striking differences between the post-Soviet  outdated vocational or technical education. Only those
and Eastern European experiences with poverty and  with special skills or university education escape poverty
targeting. Among patterns detected:  in great numbers, thanks to the demand for their skills
d  Poverty in Eastern Europe is significantly lower than  from the newly emerging private sector.
in former Soviet Union countries.  *  The poverty gap is remarkably uniform in Eastern
* Rural poverty  is greater  than urban poverty.  European countries,  especially  Hungary  and Poland,
* In Eastern  Europe  there is a strong correlation  suggesting  that social  safety  nets have  prevented  the
between  poverty  incidence  and the number of children  in  emergence  of deep pockets  of poverty.  This is much less
a household;  in the former Soviet  Union  countries  this is  true in the former Soviet  Union, where those with the
less  pronounced,  except  in Russia.  highest  poverty  rate also  have the largest poverty  gap.
* There is a gender  and age dimension  to poverty  in  In the short to medium  term, creating  employment  in
some countries.  In single-person  households,  especially  the informal  sector will generate  a larger  payoff  than
of elderly  women, the poverty  rate is very  high (except  in  creating  jobs in the formal (still  to be privatized)  sector,
Poland)  and poverty  is more severe.  The same  is true in  so programs  to help (prospective)  entrepreneurs  should
pensioner  households  (except  in Poland).  In Poland  the  take center  stage  in poverty  alleviation  programs.
pension  system  has adequate  reach.
* Poverty  rates are highest  among people who have
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ii1.  Introduction
This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of poverty in three East European
countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland,) and three countries of the Former  Soviet Union
(FSU) (Estonia, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia).  To that effect, we constructed a comparative
data  set, whereby household survey data from the six countries were  carefully checked,
cleaned  and  made  comparable.  The  resulting  data  set  has  been  dubbed  HEIDE
(Household Expenditure and Income Data for Transitional Economies) and its content and
construction method are described in detail in Ackland et al (1997).
Although our analysis of the HEIDE data found elements in common, the most
striking result is how different the post-Soviet experience with poverty and targeting is
from the East European one.  Overcoming the Soviet legacy has not been as easy as the
generally positive East European prototypes would have suggested.  Poverty correlates
for the FSU are not as sharp nor as well-defined as in Eastern Europe, yet poverty levels
are also higher in the FSU, presenting a larger challenge to  governments as they try to
reduce poverty and improve targeting.
We have set ourselves three tasks in this paper.  First, we construct a profile of the
incidence and depth of poverty in the six countries, using aggregate poverty indexes.  The
aim is to  find out  what  the common elements are in the profile of poverty in Eastern
Europe and the FSU, and which aspects of poverty are country-specific or bi-modal (e.g.
the immediate Soviet legacy of the FSU vs. the more diluted Soviet legacy of Eastern
1Europe).  If we find a large common element, it opens up the possibility of a region-wide
policy approach to poverty alleviation.
Second, we undertake a multivariate analysis of the determinants of poverty.  This
overcomes the limitations of the one- or two-dimensional approach typically embodied in
a tabular presentation of a poverty profile.  The econometric modeling work addresses
separately  the  incidence  of  poverty  and  the  depth  of  poverty,  using  reduced-form
equations.  Our objective is to  find important correlates of poverty, and, where possible,
attribute  causality to  them.  The results  will also  clarify whether  the  determinants of
welfare,  such  as  the  demographic  characteristics of  households  and  the  returns  to
household assets, differ between the poor and the non-poor.
Our third and most important task, is to derive a policy approach towards poverty
alleviation.  Specifically,  we wish to  evaluate the role which means testing and indicator-
based targeting can play in channeling social transfers to the poor.  In part because of the
socialist legacy, social transfers  constitute a  huge  component  of public expenditure in
Eastern Europe and the FSU, representing as much as one-fifth of gross domestic product
(GDP).  The need to  reduce these expenditures is pressing  and  the need  for  suitable
targeting devices is high.  We will demonstrate the  contribution which indicator-based
targeting can play.
Each of these three tasks is given a section in this paper (respectively, sections 3,
4, and 5).  Before presenting empirical results though, we address in the next section the
relevant methodological issues.
22.  Methodological Issues in the Modeling of Poverty
In line with most recent work on poverty, the analysis in this paper is based on a
money-metric measure of utility and welfare.  Total  household  expenditure is used  as
measure of household welfare and as a basis to  rank households and to  define a poverty
line. Expenditure is preferred to income because it is usually better reported in household
budget  surveys.'  Furthermore,  there  is  the  important  theoretical  consideration that
expenditure reflects better  permanent income.  This argument is particularly relevant in
transition economies where the volatility of current income is still quite high, due to  the
lack of steady private sector employment and the resulting high rates of unemployment.
Arrears on the payment of wages and pensions, especially in FSU countries, further adds
to the unreliability of current income as a measure of welfare.
The  analysis below  takes  into  account  differences  in  needs  due  to  different
household size and composition and therefore uses household expenditure per equivalent
adult as the welfare measure.  There is a wide choice of adult equivalency scales, and
different  scales are  used  in  different countries.  Our  comparative  analysis objectives
require the use of a single scale, and we have opted for the OECD scale, because of its
simplicity  of use and wide familiarity. This scale is expressed as follows
This is only  recently  the case in East European  countries. Prior to transition,  income  was usually  better reported,
because  most income sources  were under the direct control of the state, and data collection  agencies  could verify
reported income at the source.  This is why most pre-transition  analysis of poverty has used income-based
measures. After transition,  the emnergence  of private sector  income (especially  self-employment  income)  has led
to a decline in reliability of reported income data, in line with the experience of western countries (see, for
example,  Revesz,  1994 for  the case of Hungarian  income  and expenditure  data).
3EPEQ  =  (0.7)
where EXP  is total  household expenditure and n is household  size. 2 The OECD scale
reflects  economies  of  scale  due  to  household  size but  does  not  incorporate  gender
differences.
Household  expenditures  were  not  deflated  by  a  regional  price  index  to  take
potential differences in prices within the country into account. The reason is that, except
for Russia, the countries in the analysis are all fairly small and regional price differences
can be expected to be minor.  For example, for Poland (the second largest country in the
set), regional price differences were found not to exceed 2 percent (Grootaert,  1995). For
Russia, informal calculations suggested that the effect on poverty estimates of corretting
for  regional price  differences was very  small.  During the  period  of  analysis, several
countries experienced significant inflation and in these cases expenditures were  deflated
with a month-by-month consumer price index.  This yields real household expenditure per
equivalent adult as measure of household welfare.
A cut-off point needs to be selected to serve as poverty line across the distribution
of real household expenditure per equivalent adult.  We rejected the use of an absolute
line, such as x dollars in PPP-terms, due to the wide variation in income levels across the
six countries.  Indeed, it is not very meaningful  to compare poverty profiles, when for one
country the profile pertains  to  less than 5  percent  of  the population  and  for  another
2  For the household  sizes typically  found in Eastern Europe  and the FSU, this fonnulation  is a close equivalent  of
the  more conventional statement of  the OECD scale whereby the  first adult = 1,  other adults = 0.7,  and
children  = 0.5. The exponential  formulation  however  simplifies  the calculations.
4country to almost half the population.  Hence, we opted for a relative poverty line, which
after some  experimentation, was set  at two thirds  of mean  household expenditure per
equivalent adult. 3
Obviously, the  exact  position  of  the  poverty  line  selected  affects  the  results.
Individual country studies have shown that in certain ranges of the distribution, even fairly
small movements of the poverty line can have large effects on the estimated incidence of
poverty (see e.g. Grootaert,  1995 for Poland; Grootaert,  1997a for Hungary; World Bank,
1995b for Russia). -However, poverty profiles tend  to  be  more robust  than  incidence
figures, and significant  modifications do not tend to occur unless the poverty line is set in
the very lowest ranges of the distribution, especially in the lowest decile.  Nevertheless, a
sensitivity analysis would be useful, and the earlier cited country studies contain analyses
with different poverty lines.  The sheer bulk of tabular  and regression results for a six-
country study make it impractical however to include a formal sensitivity analysis in this
paper.  We refer the interested reader to the country studies.
Our selection of aggregate poverty index is the popular P-alpha class of poverty
measures introduced by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984).  This index is defined as
q  I=I  (
3  It is generally  agreed  that poverty  measures  should  be calculated  over  individuals. Hence  the relative  poverty  line
was defned over an individual  distribution,  under the assumption  that each individual  in the household  has the
same  welfare,  equal  to total  household  expenditure  per equivalent  adult.
5where  n  =  number of people
q  =  number of poor people
z  =  poverty line
yi  =  expenditure of individual  i
a  =  poverty aversion parameter
The poverty aversion parameter can take any positive value or zero.  The higher
the value the more the index "weighs" the  situation of the very poor,  i.e., the people
farthest below the poverty line. Of specific interest are the cases where  a  = o and a  = 1.
If a  = o, the index becomes
p  =q
n
which  is the simple head count ratio  of poverty, i.e. the number of poor  people as a
percentage of the total  population.  While this is a useful first indicator, it fails to  pay
attention to the depth of poverty.  To do so, one also needs to look at the extent to which
the expenditures of poor people fall below the poverty line.  This is customarily expressed
as the "income gap ratio" or "expenditure gap ratio" which expresses the average shortfall
as a fraction of the poverty line itself, i.e.,
z-y'
z
where y,  is the average income or expenditure of the poor.
6A useful index is obtained when the head count ratio of poverty is multiplied with
the income or expenditure gap ratio.  This corresponds to
which reflects both the incidence and depth of poverty.  This measure has a particularly
useful interpretation because it indicates what fraction of the poverty line would have to
be  contributed  by  every individual to  eradicate  poverty  through  transfers,  under  the
assumption of perfect  targeting.  This  can be  considered  as  the  minimum amount  of
resources  needed to  eradicate poverty, given that  perfect  targeting is  not  likely to  be
achieved in practice.
In the tables below we show the head-count ratio Po, and the ratio PI/Po, i.e. the
expenditure gap ratio. 4 We prefer to call the latter "poverty gap" (PG) to highlight that it
is a measure of the average depth of poverty calculated over the poor only.  In contrast, Po
and Pi are ratios which are calculated over the entire population (for a further discussion
of these measures, see Ravallion, 1993).  In the tables below each of these measures has
been multiplied by 100 for easier interpretation.
The comparative poverty profile in the next section of this paper is based on one-
or  two-dimensional disaggregations of  the P-alpha  index.  While this  yields a  useful
4  In making  this selection,  we trade-off  "ideal-ness"  of the poverty  measures  for the sake of familiarity  and ease of
interpretation. An ideal poverty  measure  must meet the monotonicity  axiom  (all other things  equal, a reduction  in
the  income  of a poor person must increase  the poverty  measure)  and the transfer  axiom (all other things equal, a
net transfer  of income  from a poorer  to a richer person  must increase  the poverty  measure). Neither  PO  nor Pi/Po
meet these  axioms, but their product,  Pi, meets the monotonicity  axiom. In general, the P-alpha  class of measures
meets the monotonicity  axiom for a  > O,  and the transfer axiom for a > 1 (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke,
1984).
7identification  of important  correlates  of poverty,  it cannot  establish  the relative  importance
of each correlate  (or determinant,  if causality  can be assumed). A multivariate  model of
poverty  is hence indicated. A basic model  uses real household  expenditure  per equivalent
adult as dependent  variable  in a regression  with exogenous household  endowments  and
characteristics  as explanatory  variables. Such  welfare  model  is a reduced-form  equation  of
the various structural equations which express the  income-earning  and consumption
behavior  of the household  (see e.g. Glewwe, 1991). This model  can explicitly  recognize
the economic  characteristics  of the environment  in which households  operate.  Consider
the following  model:
E,  =/3X,  +82W +  s,  (1)
where  Ei  =  real household  expenditure  per equivalent  adult of household  i
Xi  =  a set of characteristics  of households  i
Wi  =  a set of characteristics  of the economic  environment  of household  i
A,2  =  model  parameters
-aj  =  error term
While such model is not able to predict the effect of household  characteristics  on
specific  income or  consumption  decisions  (this would require structural equations),  it
allows  to observe  the net effect  of any given  characteristic,  holding  all others constant,  on
resulting  household  welfare. It is assumed  at this point that there is no simultaneous  effect
of household  welfare on household  characteristics  so that no  X,  are endogenous. This
assumption  is time-dependent,  i.e., we assume this to be the case within some relevant
time period.  (We revisit this issue below when discussing  the specific  variables  to be
8included  in the model). With this assumption,  simple  OLS estimation  of equation  (1) is
appropriate.
From the point of view of understanding  poverty, equation (1) is not necessarily
optimal. It unposes  constant parameters  over the entire  distribution. It thus assumes  that
the effect of a given  household  characteristic,  e.g. education,  is the same  across the entire
welfare  spectrum,  and that the underlying  structural  equations  do not differ for poor and
non-poor. One could say that-in this representation  the poor are viewed merely  as "rich
people with less money."  This is arguably  an incomplete  representation.  While one
should  of course not see the poverty  line  as a barrier  which  divides  the population  into two
entirely  different  groups, it is certainly  arguable  that poor people  face different  (often more
severe) constraints,  e.g. to  obtain credit, to obtain labor market information,  to set up
enterprises,  etc.  On the other hand, they may well be more adept at obtaining  transfer
income. This calls  for additional  modeling  of poverty.
There are several ways of addressing a  situation whereby parameters can be
expected to differ across different  segments  of the distribution. One can estimate the
welfare regression  separately  for poor and non-poor, or introduce a set of interaction
variables (between a binary variable for poor/non-poor and the other right-hand side
(RHS) variables). Both methods are equivalent  econometrically,  but their estimation  is
problematic.  In the  first method, each group (the poor and the non-poor) forms a
truncated  section of the overall  distribution,  so that OLS estimation  would lead to biased
estimates. The second method leads to the same result, because the binary interaction
variable is clearly endogenous-it  is merely a binary representation  of the dependent
9variable. This endogeneity  problem  also rules out the use of a Heckman-type  selection
model  to, first, determine  poverty  status and, then, using the derived  inverse  Mills-ratio  to
correct the welfare equations  of the poor and non-poor groups.  In practice, since the
poverty  criterion  is the same as the dependent  variable  in the welfare equations,  it would
be very difficult  to place  an identifying  restriction  on the welfare  equation.
A workable  solution  is at hand,  however,  if the situation  can be seen as a censored
model, in which case Tobit estimation  becomes  possible. This requires the assumption
that equation (1) is the correct welfare model for the poor and that the same set of
explanatory  variables  determine  whether one is poor or not.  No assumptions  are made
about the determinants  of welfare of the non-poor  (the process and the parameters  could
or could not be the same). The model  sets any expenditure  level higher than the poverty
line  equal  to the poverty  line,  i.e. the data are censored  at the poverty  line.
E;'= E,  if  E  c<z  (2)
E  = z  otherwise
where  z  =  poverty  line,  and Ei is determined  as in equation  (1)
This model  allows  for the possibility  of different  parameters  for the poor and non-
poor and can be estimated  consistently  if the error terms is assumed to  be nornally
distributed  (Maddala, 1983). Furthermore,  a comparison  of the estimated  parameters  of
(2) with those of (1) provides  a test of whether  the parameters  of equation (1) do indeed
differ  between  the poor and the non-poor. This is especially  relevant  for the parameters  of
asset variables,  which  measure  the returns to these assets, and one can hence test whether,
10for example,  the returns to education  differ  between  the poor and the non-poor  (Appleton,
1995).
Conceptually,  this model specification  corresponds  to modeling  the poverty gap,
i.e. the poor's expenditure  shortfall  expressed  as a ratio of the poverty  line,  i.e.
z-E,  for  Ei sz
z
Whereas  this ratio is constrained  between 0 and 1, the poverty gap itself is constrained
between 0 and z.  In practice,  it ranges between zero and z minus  the lowest E, in the
sample,  which  is what equation  (2) depicts.
When  estimating  poverty  models  on the basis of household  survey  data, it needs  to
be recognized  that such data are likely  to contain  a certain amount of measurement  error.
If the error is limited  to the dependent  variable,  it does not bias the estimated  coefficients
(so long as the error is not correlated  with any of the RHS variables),  but it will affect  the
variance-covariance  matrix. A potential  concern though is that the measurement  error of
household expenditure may rise systematically  with the  level of  expenditure.  This
increases  the probability  of correlation with RHS variables  such as education, which is
positively correlated with the  level of expenditure. This could lead to  biases in the
estimation  of equations  (1) and (2).
The presence  of measurement  error has led severai authors to substitute  limited-
dependent  variable models for the continuous welfare equation.  Gaiha (1988) used a
binary logit model to predict the probability  that a rural household in India would be
11poor. 5 Diamond et al (1990) estimate a multinomial logit model on U.S. data to predict
the probability of belonging to  an income quintile, conditional upon certain personal and
household characteristics.  Diamond et al justify their approach, relative to  a continuous
welfare regression, by arguing that the restrictions imposed by the functional form of a
levels regression  (often linear  or  log-linear) may cause  it to  fit poorly  on  the  actual
distribution, and demonstrate that this is the case for their U.S. data set.  The multinomial
logit model allows for discontinuities in the underlying welfare model and thus also solves
the concern of imposing equal parameters over the entire distribution discussed earlier.  In
the case of two  groups (poor and non-poor) the approach collapses to  a binary logit or
probit model, although then the underlying welfare model is again continuous (Ravallion,
1996).  There  has  been  a  recent  debate  in  the  literature  on  the  merits  of  welfare
regressions  versus  binary  poverty  models.  Ravallion (1996)  argues  that  the  binary
response model  is redundant,  since the  parameters measuring the  effect of  household
characteristics on the probability to  be poor can be  derived from  the levels regression,
which is consistently estimable under  weaker assumptions about the distribution of the
error.  As argued  in Grootaert  (1997b), this argument applies if there  is only random
measurement error and if a case can be made for imposing constant parameters over the
entire distribution.
As we discussed earlier, the latter issue has been dealt with in this analysis through
Tobit  estimation  of the  expenditure of the  "poor"  segment  of the  distribution.  The
possibility of systematic measurement error has led us to undertake also probit estimation
5  To our Inowledge,  the first use of such model in the empirical poverty literature  is by Bardhan (1984) in a study
of poverty  in rural West Bengal.
12of  a  poverty  equation  where  the  dependent  variable  is  binary  (poor/non-poor).
Explanatory variables are the same as in the welfare regression.  It is clearly a judgment
call whether the loss of information embodied in the  binary regression  (collapsing the
entire distribution into two values) outweighs the risk of bias due to  measurement error.
However, to the extent that results from a binary model confirm levels-regression results,
they can act as-  a robustness test for the latter.  In recent years, use of probit and logit
models (mainly the former) have become common practice in poverty analysis (see e.g.
Alderman and  Ga7rcia, 1993; Lanjouw and  Stem,  1991; World  Bank,  1995d,  1996d;
Appleton, 1996; Grootaert,  1997b).
In summary, the determinants of poverty will be  estimated in this  paper on the
basis of three models:
(i)  OLS regression of welfare equation (1);
To account for differences in parameters between the poor and nonpoor, (the poor are not
rich with less money) without losing information from level-regressions:
(ii)  Tobit estimation of the welfare level of the poor,  based on equation (2);
this is equivalent to modeling the poverty gap;
To solve the problem of non-random measurement error (especially mismeasurement as a
function of level of expenditure):
(iii)  Probit estimation of a binary poverty equation.
13Each of these three models has the same RHS and we turn now to the discussion
of which variables can be considered exogenous household characteristics.  As we pointed
out earlier, this is mainly a function of the time horizon considered relevant. It has become
fashionable in econometrics to take a rather narrow view on this (i.e., to consider a long
time horizon) and  to  estimate welfare  models with  very  parsimonious RHS  (see  e.g.
Glewwe and Hall, 1995).  As Appleton (1995) has argued, reasons can be  found why
almost  every  conceivable  determinant  of  poverty  is  simultaneously determined  with
welfare, and he cites a number of examples of such discussions in the literature.  In the
end,  little more  than  gender, age  and  a  few  parental  characteristics end  up  as truly
6 exogenous.  Such econometric purity is problematic if the analysis is meant  to  guide
policy.  Most policy and targeting variables at the household level become endogenous if
the time period is made long enough.  All assets (education, physical capital, land) as well
as household size are to  some degree a function of the household's welfare level and its
evolution over  the  life cycle.  Location can  change due  to  migration.  Likewise, the
household head can change as a result of migration, or the splitting of one household into
several households (or the reverse process).
While we recognize the strict validity of these arguments, for this exercise we have
taken a pragmatic view, and used a fairly generous set of RHS variables.  The objective is
to identify determinants of welfare and poverty which, in the short run, are valid policy
and targeting variables.  As relevant time frame, we consider the reference period for the
data collection, i.e. a year or less.  We include therefore on the RHS variables which the
typical household in the six transition economies in question cannot change in a one-year
6  In an inter-generational  context,  even parental  characteristics  can be endogenous.
14period  or only with great  difficulty or  cost.  This takes  the specific situation of these
economies into account, and explains e.g. why some labor market variables are included
on the RHS.  In a filly functioning market economy, occupation and labor market status
must  be viewed as endogenous, but this is not the case in many transition economies.
Unemployment is high and largely structural, retraining opportunities are limited, and in
some  countries,  the  supply of  housing is  not  yet  sufficiently flexible to  permit  easy
migration to areas of growing labor demand.
On the other hand, among the asset variables, we have not included ownership of
durable goods on the RHS for estimating the three models listed above.  This is actually
more of a judgment call than it may appear.  Until a few years ago, in the countries in our
analysis, such goods were rationed.  With the possible exceptions of Hungary and Estonia,
there  is  not  yet  a  fully operating  market  for  these  goods,  accessible to  the  entire
population.  Markets  for durable goods such as personal computers,  VCRs,  etc. often
exist only in cities, and due to very high relative prices (compared e.g. to Western Europe)
accumulation and decumulation of such goods is rare for all but the very rich.  For many
households, the existing stock is still largely determined by the pre-transition allocation.
Nevertheless this situation is rapidly changing.
Generally speaking, asset variables have to be seen as endogenous with respect to
household welfare, because in an inter-temporal context, the household's welfare level will
determine  the  extent  of  education  children  receive  and  will  determine  capital
accumulation. For one-period model estimation, based on cross-sectional household data,
the case for exogeneity is stronger, but not absolute.  In principle, it would be desirable to
15replace these variables with instruments such as parents'  education, inherited wealth, etc.
Unfortunately, such variables are not available in the data sets and our regressions include
productive  asset  variables on  the  RHS.  In  interpreting the  regression  results,  some
caution will thus be necessary, not to view the estimated coefficients as measuring strictly
one-way causality from assets to welfare or poverty.
Using a  one-year time frame, we  consider as  exogenous  the  following sets of
variables:
*  household  assets:  education,  physical  capital  (house,  household
enterprises), land;
o  demographic household characteristics:  household  size and composition
and characteristics of the head of household;
*  labor market  connections:  unemployment, and  share of wages  in total
income;
*  economic environment: location.
The human capital of the household is embodied in its members and hence their
numbers (by sex and age group) are introduced as regressors.  Since it is likely that the
education  of  the  head  of household  has  a  greater  influence on  welfare and  poverty
outcomes than that of other members, the education level of the head was introduced as a
separate regressor, by means of a series of dummy variables reflecting the highest level of
education achieved (primary or  less, secondary, vocational/technical, university).  The
earlier cited  country  poverty  studies  have indeed  found  strong  bivariate correlations
between poverty incidence and the level of education of the head of household.  The data
at hand do not provide information on work experience, but this can be proxied by age.
16The age of the household head is also a good indicator of the stage in the life cycle of the
household.
Information on physical  capital  is somewhat scant in the data  sets.  We know
whether  the household owns a farm or small business but have no information on the value
of its assets.  Nevertheless, information on ownership (or use, in countries where legal
ownership is still unclear) is bound to be very important, because the emergence of small
private enterprises is a key feature of transition, and poverty among such entrepreneurs is
likely to be below average.
Ownership of a house is important in the same sense.  In many cases it provides
the location for a household enterprise, and for many households it constitutes the main
asset  against which it can borrow  and  from which it derives rental  income (actual or
imputed).'  In most transition economies, the supply of housing is still quite rigid, and a
housing market is absent in many locations.  Housing ownership is still frequently the
result  of  pre-transition  allocations  by  the  state.  hence,  there  is  a  strong  case  for
considering  home  ownership  as  exogenous  to  the  process  of  determining  welfare.
Similarly, ownership of land is in most transition settings not yet a full household choice
variable,  and,  especially in  rural  areas,  it  is  a  key  determinant  of  cash  income  and
consumption of food.
7  Ackland  et al (1997)  discuss  in detail the procedures  used for the computation  of the value  of housing  services.
17The link with the labor market is captured in the model with two variables:  the
share of wages  in total  household income, and the  number of unemployed  household
members (in  some  cases this was  replaced by the  employment status  of the  head of
household, if this variable yielded a better specification).  The case for exogeneity of these
variables rests on the fact that in the transition context, many of the labor market status
outcomes are determined, or at least greatly influenced, by the labor market status that
obtained prior to transition and/or by the macro-economic changes.  Of course, it must be
recognized that personal characteristics do contribute to unemployment, or make it more
or less  likely than  a  person will successfully obtain  self-employment income.  Again,
instrumental  variables  would  provide  a  solution  if  they  were  available.  (E.g.  one
possibility would be to use regional rather than household-specific labor market variables).
We kept these variables in the equation mainly because of their importance for targeting,
but again recognize the need for caution in interpreting the coefficients.
The way in which the household utilizes its  asset  endowment  is a  function of
various  demographic  household  characteristics.  The  demographic  structure  of  the
household has been shown to have a strong relation with poverty incidence.  Beyond the
number of children and adults, it is useful to specify the age and sex of the household head
because those factors may be related to the household's  ability to  cope with a changing
economic environment.
Lastly, the incidence of poverty is affected by the economic environment in which
the household operates.  This relates especially to income earning opportunities and the
level of social and economic infrastructure.  In a transition context, the household's ability
18to  adjust to  a new economic reality will depend very much upon whether it lives in an
urban  or  rural area,  in a large  or  small city, in an old  industrial  region, etc.  In this
research, we will capture this by categorical variables for type of locality (capital or other
city, village).
Annex 1 shows the means and standard deviations for the full set of variables used
in estimating the welfare and poverty equations.
Apart from laying out the set of determinants of welfare and poverty (the objective
of Section 4), these equations can also be used to investigate how feasible means-testing
and indicator-based targeting is.  Almost all East European  and FSU countries rely on
these techniques to allocate social assistance and sometimes other transfers as well.  If an
effective, reliable and low-cost test for income were available, there would of course be no
need for indicator-based targeting.  In practice, most social assistance authorities find it
very difficult to apply means tests and find that applicants on average underreport income,
especially self-employment income.  We wanted to test how many poor people could be
correctly identified based  on  a  simplified means test  and  relying on easily identifiable
indicators.  To that effect we re-estimated equation (1) with an expanded set of variables,
adding  wage-income and  public-transfer  income  (the  two  "official"  and  most  easily
verifiable income  components for  most  households),  and  also  a  list of  durable goods
owned by the household.
As we discussed earlier, these variables are likely to be endogenous to the level of
welfare, but our objective here is simply to predict outcomes.  Hence, we do not interpret
the estimated coefficients of e.g. TV ownership as the "contribution" of this variable to
19welfare, but merely as a partial correlation coefficient incorporating all feedback effects
from welfare to durable ownership.  We estimated the expanded equation (1) with forward
step-wise OLS, so as to identify the strongest correlates and best predictors first. 8 as to
identify the strongest correlates and best predictors first. The results of this exercise are
discussed in Section 5.
3.  Poverty Profiles
The changing nature  of poverty in Eastern Europe  and  the Former  Soviet Union has
paralleled the sharp changes in economic management and in government in the region
over the past two decades.  Even before the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the break-up
of the Soviet Union, East European  countries had been  experimenting with economic
reforms which  brought  their  systems closer to  market  economies.  Two  of the  early
leaders in such reform efforts, Hungary and Poland,  are case studies for  this analysis.
Hungary was arguably the first country in Eastern Europe to embrace economic reforms,
with its market-oriented New Economic Mechanism, and Poland's  Solidarity movement
was an early large-scale populist movement towards more democratic government and a
freer economic environment.
Along with  economic reform in Eastern Europe  quickly came the labor market
consequences of shutting down non-profitable state enterprises.  Unlike in the FSU, where
adjustment was much later and fell almost exclusively on real wages, in Eastern Europe,
s  It would also be possible to use a step-wise  poverty  probit equation for this objective. However,  most social
assistance  authorities  are interested  not  just in classifying  applicants  as poor/non-poor  but also in detennining  the
extent of the welfare shortfall. Hence,  the OLS  welfare  equation  is a more  useful basis for a predictive  model.
20open unemployment along with real wage declines was characteristic of phase changes in
government and the economy.  One paradoxical result of this is that poverty is much more
clearly defined in Eastern  Europe  than  in the  FSU,  and  the  poverty  profiles of East
European countries identify poverty correlates more clearly.  This makes improvements in
targeting in Eastem Europe much more realistic to posit than in the FSU, where the poor
are not so well-differentiated from the not-so-poor.
Although this conclusion might seem somewhat surprising, it is not especially new.
Even with far more inferior databases, Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) concluded that
poverty in Eastern Europe was more defined and less all-encompassing than poverty in the
Former Soviet Union.  However, during the reference period for their work (1991 and
earlier) the  FSU  had  not  broken  up;  nor  had  there  been  the  sharp  changes  in  the
macroeconomic environment associated  with  the dissolution  of  the FSU,  so it  is not
surprising that  the  earlier time  period  and  the  use  of  official data  led Atkinson  and
Micklewright (1992) to conclude that overall, FSU poverty was not as severe as in many
East  European  countries,  but  further,  that  poverty  within  the  FSU  was  highly
heterogeneous (see also Braithwaite, 1991).
With the breakup of the FSU, there were severe disruptions in the old trading and
monetary  regimes.  The  demise  of  the  ruble  zone,  the  political  ramifications of  the
declarations of independence, the build-up of arrears in the payment for energy imports,
the  difficulties in  macro  management  of  the  newly  independent  countries,  and  the
difficulties in finding alternative suppliers for intermediate inputs (which in many cases
were highly specialized), all combined to result in catastrophic declines in GDP.  Whereas
21the aggregate decline in GDP for the East European countries was 10 percent during the
period 1990-96, it was 45 percent for the FSU.  Especially sharp declines were registered
in 1993 and 1994, which were run-away hyperinflation years in most FSU countries.
Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that open poverty has increased
drastically in the FSU.  Poverty  also increased in Eastern Europe, but  Eastern Europe
managed to avoid most of the macroeconomic disruption associated with the break-up of
the  FSU,  or  if  problems  such  as  hyperinflation  and  collapsing  real  wages  were
encountered, they were  encountered  much earlier than  during  1990-96.  As  a  result,
poverty  in  Eastern  Europe  has  become  much  more  like  poverty  in  Western
Europe-highly  correlated with the situation in the formal labor market and the skills of
individuals.  As  the poverty profiles below  indicate, in the FSU,  poverty  is not  well-
correlated with the nature of labor market participation of household members, but neither
is it -well-correlated with  the lack of formal labor market ties.  Basically, in the FSU,
poverty is more pervasive than in Eastern Europe and not  as well-defined.  It  is much
more difficult to  differentiate a  poor  FSU  household  from  a  non-poor  one  based  on
observable correlates.
These qualitative  and  quantitative  differences in  the  experience of  poverty  in
Eastern  Europe  and the  FSU  are  demonstrated  in by the  cross-tabulation  of  poverty
correlates, headcounts, and measures of severity of poverty presented below.
22A.  Eastern Europe
In Eastern Europe, the start of rapid transition in the early 1990s accelerated the
existing trend towards increasing poverty 9. The main contributing factors were the loss of
employment in  a  suddenly contracting  state-sector,  without  coincident  emergence  of
private sector employment. Rapidly rising unemployment has in fact been one of the most
visible signs of the social costs of transition.  A number of East European countries also
experienced significant inflation (although it did not reach the level of the hyper-inflation
experienced by some FSU countries).  Adjustments in wages, pensions and other social
transfers lagged behind, and real incomes for many people fell.  However, the emerging
evidence suggests that these effects have been fairly short-lived.  The three East European
countries in this study experienced less GDP declines than the three FSU countries, and in
the 1994-1995 period, they have each returned to positive growth.
The figures in Table I indicate that poverty rates as well as poverty gaps are lower
in the East European countries than in the FSU countries.  As a reminder, poverty rates
measure the incidence of poverty as the percentage of population below the poverty line
(two-thirds  of  mean household  expenditure per  equivalent  adult).  The  poverty  gap
measures the depth of poverty as the poor's  average shortfall in expenditures from the
poverty line expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. (Both measures were discussed
in detail in Section 2).  FSU poverty rates exceed 30 percent and poverty gaps exceed
20 percent.  Russia has the worst situation with a poverty incidence of almost 40 percent
and an average poverty gap of 30 percent.  While the poverty rate of Kyrgyz Republic is
9  See Milanovic  (1990)  for an analysis  of pre-transition  trends in poverty.
23higher (42.5 percent), its poverty gap is lower (25 percent)  than Russia's.  Hungary and
Poland show the most favorable situation with respective poverty rates of 21 percent and
23 percent.  The poverty gap is slightly higher in Hungary (14.1 percent) than in Poland
(13.3 percent).  It thus appears that poverty in Eastern Europe is much more shallow than
in FSU, which is good  news from the point of view  of poverty alleviation in Eastern
Europe.  It  suggests that as economic growth resumes,  rising incomes may rapidly lift
many people above the poverty line.
Table 1:  Poverty and Locality
Locality  Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland  Estonia  Kyrgyz  Russia
Republic
Headcount (P 0, in percent)
Capital  17.5  20.3  10.1  20.6  22.9  18.2
Other Cities  20.5  17.7  16.9  31.6  38.0  38.4
Urban  Subtotal  19.9  18.5  16.2  27.5  33.3  35.8
Rural  39.2  24.0  33.8  38.7  47.2  49.6
Total  26.1  20.6  23.0  30.5  42.5  39.4
Poverty Gap (in percent) 1/
Capital  19.9  13.9  13.4  19.7  24.0  20.7
Other Cities  17.8  13.5  12.7  19.2  26.2  28.7
Urban  Subtotal  18.1  13.6  12.7  19.4  25.7  28.1
Rural  21.7  14.6  13.8  21.9  24.7  33.2
Total  19.8  14.1  13.3  20.2  25.0  29.8
Source: Household  Expenditure  and Income  Date for Transition  Economies  Data Set (HEIDE).
Notes:  .
1/ The poverty  gap is the poor's  average  shortfall  in expenditures  from the poverty  line, expressed  as a
percentage  of the poverty  line (this  measure  is also  known  as the expenditure  gap ratio).
24Location
The strong causal role played by changes in employment in creating poverty during
transition in Eastern  Europe  make it likely that transition economies  will show  strong
geographic  patterns  of  poverty  and  that  urban  and  rural  areas  will  be  affected
differentially.
This is confirmed by Table 1 which shows that in all three East European countries
rural poverty is higher than urban poverty.  In Bulgaria and Poland, rates of rural poverty
incidence are almost twice the urban rates.  In Hungary, the urban-rural difference is small.
Within urban  areas,  the  differences between  the  capital  and  other  cities  are  not  so
pronounced.  (This is a marked difference with the situation in the FSU in which capital
cities are markedly less poor than other cities).  In Bulgaria and Poland, poverty rates are
slightly lower in the capital than in other cities, but in Hungary the reverse is true.
The depth of poverty varies less than the incidence of poverty in Eastern Europe.
In general, poverty is slightly deeper in rural areas than in urban areas, but within the latter
poverty is deepest in the capital cities.  So, while East European capitals have generally
less poverty than elsewhere, the poor in those capital cities do have a greater shortfall in
expenditure than elsewhere.  This situation is distinct from the FSU, where both poverty
incidence and poverty gap are lowest in the capital cities.
25Family Composition
Almost all empirical work on poverty in Eastern Europe and the FSU has identified
a strong correlation between household size and composition and poverty incidence.  In
Eastern Europe, the correlation is strongest with number of children.  In each of the three
countries analyzed here, households with three or more children have poverty incidence
about double the national rate (Table 2).  It does not matter much whether this is a nuclear
household  or  an  extended  household with  more than  two  adults.  The  exception  is
Hungary where the poverty rate in extended households with three or more children is
more than triple the national rate.  This is because in Hungary extended households often
arise as a result of poverty, which forces separate households to merge in order to benefit
from economies of scale in housing and other expenditures.
The implication is that in Eastern Europe, poverty among children is higher than
average  and  the  presence  of  children  needs  to  be  considered  as  a  strong  candidate
indicator for targeting.  We will revisit this proposition in the following sections when
reviewing the multivariate results.  The finding of a strong correlation between poverty
and the presence of children also constitutes a call to reform entitlement programs such as
family allowances which provides fixed amounts of money to  households with children.
These allowances are probably not needed by the richer households, and they are clearly
insufficient to  prevent  households with  many children  from  falling into  poverty.  A
possible solution is to introduce means-testing and to increase the amounts given to large
26Table  2: Poverty  and  Family  Composition
Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland  Estonia  Kyrgyz  Russia
Republic
Family Composition
Headcount (P0, in percent)
One Male Adult, No Children  33.1  24.2  15.6  32.5  40.0  52.5
One Female Adult, No Children  45.0  27.8  13.5  37.0  51.8  47.8
One Adult, One or More Children  23.4  32.1  28.2  43.5  39.7  45.0
Two Adults, No Children  27.4  17.9  12.2  28.2  40.1  37.4
Two Adults, One Child  15.2  20.1  16.1  30.5  42.4  37.0
Two Adults, Two Children  19.4  19.9  24.7  29.6  39.9  38.7
Two Adults, Three or More Children  61.3  38.1  43.3  28.5  49.1  64.2
Three or More Adults, No Children  22.7  13.9  16.6  24.4  37.0  30.2
Three or More Adults. One Child  20.1  17.7  20.2  27.8  35.6  35.8
ThreeorMoreAdults.TwoChildren  35.8  29.5  36.2  31.6  43.3  51.6
Three or More Adults, Three or More  55.9  71.1  46.2  57.6  43.6  60.4
Children
All  26.1  20.6  23.0  30.5  42.5  39.4
Poverty Gap  (in percent)  11
One Male Adult, No Children  26.0  17.9  22.4  34.3  39.5  42.0
One Female Adult, No Children  28.9  18.6  17.3  27.5  47.4  44.2
One Adult, One or More Children  25.0  20.8  19.7  24.3  26.8  35.9
Two Adults, No Children  20.8  13.8  14.5  20.3  31.8  33.5
Two Adults, One Child  14.3  15.1  13.6  18.8  27.7  26.9
Two Adults, Two Children  18.1  13.1  12.8  17.4  26.7  27.0
Two Adults, Three or More Children  22.0  13.5  13.6  16.8  27.0  28.3
Three or More Adults, No Children  16.2  12.6  13.2  17.3  26.2  27.6
Three or More Adults, One Child  18.6  12.7  12.5  16.2  21.8  26.1
Three or More Adults, Two Children  19.3  12.8  12.8  16.6  23.0  25.0
Three or More Adults, Three or More  24.5  13.8  11.7  17.1  22.8  26.6
Children
All  19.8  14.1  13.3  20.2  25.0  29.8
Source:  Household Expenditure and Income Date for Transition Economies Data Set (HEIDE).
Notes:
1/ The poverty gap is the poor's average shortfall in expenditures from the poverty line, expressed as a
percentage of the poverty line (this measure is also known as the expenditure gap ratio).
27poor  households.  Grootaert  (1995,  1997a)  contains  simulation  exercises  which
demonstrate, in the cases of Poland and Hungary, that this can be achieved in a budget-
neutral fashion,  and  that  it  has the  potential of  significantly reducing  poverty among
children.  In part, the potential success from introducing means-testing results from the
fact that the poverty gap is not higher among households with many children.  This means
that on a per capita basis, the resources needed to  lift these households out of poverty is
not greater than for other kinds of households.  In fact, the uniformnity  of the poverty gap
across different types of households, displayed in Table 2, is quite a remarkable feature of
poverty in Eastern Europe.
Apart  from  large  households,  poverty  incidence  is  also  above  average  in
households with one  adult.  The situation is especially bad  in Bulgaria among women
living alone, where poverty incidence is 45%.  Most of these are pensioners.  In Poland, in
contrast, households consisting of one man or one woman have below average poverty
rates,  reflecting that  pensions in Poland  are  higher than  elsewhere.  In  Hungary  and
Poland, one-adult households with children have higher poverty rates than those without
children, and there is some evidence that such households are more likely to fall through
the cracks of the family allowance system and to  not receive these benefits (Grootaert,
1995, 1997a).  Poor one-adult households also experience deeper poverty than other poor
households:  in all three countries, they have larger poverty gaps than any other type of
households.
While Table 2 expresses the composition of the household in terms of the number
of adults and the number of children, Table 3 indicates that the number of elderly among
28the adults is also correlated with poverty. Except in Poland, households consisting only of
elderly have the highest poverty incidence and poverty gap.  We return to this later when
discussing the age-dimension of poverty.
Table 3:  Poverty and Aggregate Family Composition
Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland  Estonia  Kyrgyz  Russia
Republic
Family Composition
Headcount (P0, in percent)
No Children, No Elderly  18.3  13.0  13.3  23.8  37.6  31.9
Child(ren), No Elderly  25.0  23.9  28.1  32.8  43.1  40.5
No Children, Elder(ly),  39.0  26.1  18.1  39.4  43.8  43.8
Child(ren), Elder(ly)  28.0  22.2  32.7  35.2  42.9  51.5
All  26.1  20.6  23.0  30.5  42.5  39.4
Poverty Gap (in percent) V1
No Children, No Elderly  18.8  13.6  13.6  22.0  29.4  32.2
Child(ren), No Elderly  19.4  14.1  13.2  18.3  24.2  27.1
No Children, Elder(ly)  21.1  15.1  15.5  22.8  34.0  35.5
Child(ren), Elder(ly)  19.5  10.5  11.9  19.2  23.9  27.0
All  19.8  14.1  13.3  20.2  25.0  29.8
Source:  Household Expenditure and Income Date for Transition Economies Data Set (HEIDE).
Notes:
I/  The poverty gap is the poor's average shortfall in expenditures from the poverty line, expressed as a
percentage of the poverty line (this measure is also known as the expenditure  gap ratio).
29Labor  Force Participation
It  is  not  surprising that  labor force  status  is strongly  correlated  with  poverty
outcomes in Eastern Europe.  In all countries, wage earners and the self-employed have
the lowest poverty incidence and poverty gap (Table 4).  Which of these two groups does
best  depends on the stage of transition.  In Hungary, with perhaps the best developed
private sector, and the earliest initiation of transition, the self-employed have the lowest
poverty incidence-slightly  more than half the national rate.  Elsewhere though, wage-
work still provides the better alternative.
Table 4 also shows though  that being a  pensioner sharply increases the odds of
being poor, except in Poland, and in all countries pensioners have above average poverty
gaps.  The favorable situation of pensioners in Poland is due to the generosity of the Polish
pension system.  Of all East European countries, Poland increased spending on pensions
the most: between 1988 and 1993, pension spending rose from 6.9 percent to 14.7 percent
of GDP (Perraudin and Pujol,  1994).  One reason for this was the sudden swelling of the
ranks of pensioners by 1.5 million  early retirees in the period 1989-1992.  Furthermore, in
1992-93, the average pension in Poland was 64 percent of the average wage-the  highest
ratio in Eastern Europe.  Polish pensions were at that time also fully indexed (Milanovic,
1995).  10
I0  The  pension  systen in Poland  is discussed  in detail in World  Bank (1993)  and Peffaudin  and Pujol (1994). For a
more general  discussion  of pension  systems  in transition  economies,  see World  Bank (1994).
30Table 4: Poverty and Socio-Economic  Status
Socio-Economic  Group  of  Bulgaria Hungary  Poland  Estonia  Kyrgyz  Russia
Household  Head  Republic
Headcount (Po, in percent)
Wage  Earner  16.4  15.7  18.7  23.1  38.8  32.5
Self-Employed  24.3  12.7  26.8  26.7  40.3  31.5
Pensioner  44.3  27.4  19.4  47.7  57.0  52.6
Other Transfer  Recipient  63.7  57.1  64.1  54.3  61.9  68.7
Other  46.5  49.4  33.5  31.0  42.2  45.2
All  26.1  20.6  23.0  30.5  42.5  39.4
Poverty Gap (in percent) 1/
WageEarner  14.4  12.1  11.7  17.0  23.4  26.9
Self-Employed  15.3  11.1  14.4  24.6  24.8  27.9
Pensioner  23.7  15.9  14.4  23.1  28.6  35.8
Other Transfer  Recipient  30.0  21.1  18.6  26.1  26.8  33.1
Other  28.8  16.5  11.5  17.9  25.1  27.8
All  19.8  14.1  13.3  20.2  25.0  29.8
Source: Household  Expenditure  and Income  Date  for Transition Economies  Data Set (HEIDE).
Notes:
1/ he poverty  gap is the poor's average  shortfall  in expenditures  from the poverty  line, expressed  as a
percentage  of the poverty  linc (this  measure  is also known  as the expenditure  gap ratio).
31While  the  self-employed are  a  new  socioeconomic  category  in  countries  in
transition, representing people who have succeeded in adapting economically to transition,
there is also another socioeconomic category emerging of people who have fallen victim
to transition:  those who have severed ties to the labor market, and who are unemployed
or irregularly employed, and for whom as a result transfer income (other than pensions)
has become the main source of income.  This category of people has poverty rates that are
around 60 percent, and they also have poverty gaps which are above average.  However,
except for this category of households, Table 4 again confirms the remarkable evenness of
the poverty gap across society.  We already pointed at the uniformity of the poverty gap
across demographic types of households (Table 2) and the same uniformity is seen across
socioeconomic categories.
The specific effect of being unemployed is illustrated in Table 5 which shows the
poverty measures  by  the  number  of  unemployed  household  members.  In  Hungary,
households without unemployed members have a poverty incidence of  16.9 percent.  If
one  household  member is unemployed, the  figure jumps  to  30.5  percent,  and  it rises
further to  68.7 percent if three or  more members are unemployed.  In Poland, poverty
incidence is 19.7 percent in households without an unemployed member but 50.7 percent
in households with  two  unemployed members.  Again though,  the poverty gap  is not
systematically related to the number of unemployed household members, indicating that
the social safety net does what it is supposed to do, namely preventing the emergence of
pockets  of deep  poverty.  (Of course,  this  finding does  not  consider overall cost  or
efficiency  in achieving this result).
32Table 5:  Poverty  and  Unemployment
Number  of Unemployed  Bulgaria Hungary  Poland  Estonia  Kyrgyz  Russia
Members  in the Household  Republic
Headcount (P0, in percent)
0  ...  16.9  19.7  28.4  42.0  37.6
1  ..  30.5  35.7  42.6  41.9  53.2
2  ...  39.2  50.7  53.1  54.4  73.7
3 or more  ...  68.7  46.5  73.2  40.6  66.7
All  26.1  20.6  23.0  30.5  42.5  39.4
Poverty  Gap (in percent)  V/
0  ...  13.1  13.0  19.5  24.4  30.1
1  ...  16.0  13.6  22.2  26.5  28.5
2  ...  13.6  15.1  27.3  24.4  25.6
3 or more  ...  17.9  17.5  30.8  33.9  39.7
All  19.8  14.1  13.3  20.2  25.0  29.8
Source:  Household Expenditure and Income Date for Transition Economies Data Set (HEIDE).
Notes:
I/  The poverty gap is the poor's average shortfall in expenditures from the poverty line, expressed as a
percentage of the poverty line (this measure is also known as the expenditure gap ratio).
The role of education in this process is made clear in Table 6.  There is a distinct
difference between the East European and the FSU countries.  In Eastern Europe, the link
between lower poverty and higher education is extremely pronounced, but in the FSU this
link is much weaker, to being almost non-existent in Kyrgyz Republic.  In Hungary, e.g.,
the poverty incidence among households where the head has primary education or less is
33.9 percent,  while  in  households  where  the  head  has  university  education  it  is
3.3 percent,  i.e.  ten  times  less.  The  equivalent  figures  for  Kyrgyz  Republic  are
43.2 percent  and  37.6 percent.  The  other  countries are  somewhere in-between  these
extremes.
33Table 6:  Poverty and Education
Education of  Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland  Estonia  Kyrgyz  Russia
Household Head  Republic
Headcount (P0, in percent)
Primary or Less  41.1  33.9  33.0  41.5  43.2  46.2
Secondary  15.6  10.4  13.1  30.0  49.2  40.3
Vocationa/Technical  1/  15.0  18.7  26.3  ...  41.3  39.5
University or Above  8.9  3.3  3.8  12.7  37.6  25.9
All  26.1  20.6  23.0  30.5  42.5  39.4
Poverty Gap (in percent) 2/
Primary or Less  21.6  15.6  14.7  22.7  35.4  35.4
Secondary  16.1  11.8  12.8  19.4  29.6  29.6
VocationalTechnical  1/  12.6  11.9  12.3  ...  28.2  28.2
Universitv or Above  14.6  9.8  8.1  14.8  24.0  24.0
All  19.8  14.1  13.3  20.2  29.8  29.8
Source:  Household Expenditure and Income Date for Transition Economies Data Set (HEIDE).
NVotes:
I/  For Estonia, secondary education and vocational-technical education are combined and shown in the
category labeled "Secondary."  Definitional problems in the Estonian dataset precluded a separation of
these two kinds of education.
2J/ The poverty gap is the poor's average shortfall in expenditures from the poverty line, expressed as a
percentage of the poverty line (this measure is also known as the expenditure gap ratio).
34This  difference in  the  impact of  education  is  clearly related  to  the  stage  of
transition.  The further advanced transition is, the more a private sector emerges which
needs  well-educated workers,  with  general education backgrounds  which  makes them
flexible and adaptable to the newly emerging skill requirements.  Pre-transition vocational
and technical education,  often geared  towards  traditional  industrial occupations,  is no
longer in demand.  Similarly, low-skill jobs,  of the type held by workers  with primary
education or less,  have disappeared  in great  numbers.  The more  advanced transition
countries such as Hungary and Poland have already experienced skill-shortages in fields
like engineering, computer  science and the  like, and  this  will further  push up  wages
received by workers  with university education, and increase the wage-gap across  skill-
levels.  This is one  of the main reasons why the distribution of wages has increased in
many transition economies (Milanovic, 1995, 1997).
Education is also the only dimension where the wage gap  is not  uniform across
categories in Eastern  Europe.  Workers with  primary or  less education  have not  only
poverty rates well above average, but the poverty gap is also significantly higher than for
other groups.  Households where the  head has a university education have the lowest
poverty gap of any category, along any dimension, displayed in the poverty profile.  It may
be surprising that the poverty gap varies so much with education level, while it varies very
little with  the  number  of  unemployed in  the  household.  In  part,  the  reason  is that
education is not used as a targeting variable for any transfer program (although our results
suggest  that  perhaps  it  should become  a  targeting  variable for  Eastern  Europe-see
Section 5).  Although  clearly  low  education  is  in  itself  a  contributing  factor  to
35unemployment, many people with low education still hold full-time jobs (let us not forget
that  they  are  a  very  large  category:  in  Poland  and  Hungary,  about  two-thirds  of
households have heads with primary or vocational/technical education).  Their wages are
low, and as our results indicate, often insufficient to keep them above the poverty line.
Still,  as  full-time workers,  they  do  not  qualify for  any  transfers  (other  than  general
entitlements) to supplement their income.  There is no immediate solution to this situation.
In the medium to long term, retraining and a general upgrading of schooling curricula will
reduce the number of people with low education.  Also, people with low education are
older than average, and many of them will become absorbed in the pension system in the
near  term.  Whether  this  will  alleviate their  poverty,  depends  partly  upon  policies
pertaining to minimum pensions.
Gender  and  Age
- We  already noted the correlation  between household  composition  and  poverty
outcomes, especially the association between the presence of three  or more children and
high poverty incidence. Since demographic household characteristics are easily observable
and potentially useful targeting variables, it is worthwhile to look in more detail at the age
and gender dimensions of poverty in Eastern Europe.
Table 7 shows that female-headed households have systematically higher poverty
incidence and poverty gaps than  male-headed households.  The  difference is slight in
Poland, but more pronounced in Hungary and Bulgaria.  The multivariate analysis in the
next section will confirm that such a gender-effect remains even after controlling for the
36characteristics of female-headed households that are strongly correlated with poverty such
as low education.
Table  7: Poverty  and  Gender  of Household  Head
Gender ofHousehold  Head  Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland  Estonia  Kyrgyz  Russia
Republic
Headcount  (P 0, in percent)
Male  24.0  19.1  22.7  27.9  41.6  37.8
Female  40.5  25.6  23.7  39.1  50.5  46.0
All  26.1  20.6  23.0  30.5  42.5  39.4
Poverty  Gap (in percent) 11
Male  18.6  13.3  13.0  18.7  24.7  28.5
Female  24.5  16.0  14.2  23.9  27.5  34.5
All  19.8  14.1  13.3  20.2  25.0  29.8
Source: Household  Expenditure  and  Income  Date  for  Transition  Economies  Data  Set  (HEIDE).
Notes:
I/  he poverty  gap is the  poor's  average  shortfall  in expenditures  from  the  povertv  line,  expressed  as a
percentage  of  the poverty  line  (this  measure  is also  known  as the  expenditure  gap ratio).
The age distribution of poverty in Table 8 highlights the extent to which poverty in
Eastern Europe is concentrated among the very young and the very old.  The average
poverty incidence in Poland is 23 percent, but  among children under ten it exceeds 30
percent.  The numbers for Hungary  show  a  similar pattern.  In Bulgaria, the  relative
concentration of poverty among children is actually least.  This is not a contradiction with
the earlier finding that in Bulgaria poverty rates among households with three or more
children are very high, because such households are quite rare in Bulgaria (much rarer than
in the other two countries).  Hence, in Bulgaria most children live in households with one
or two children where poverty rates are lower.
37Table  8:  Poverty  and Age
Age Bracket  Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland  Estonia  Kyrgyz  Russia
Republic
Headcount  (Po,  in percent)
0-4  29.0  30.0  35.3  33.3  46.4  47.9
5-9  28.2  26.0  31.6  32.0  46.0  42.9
10-14  24.2  20.9  27.6  34.1  41.1  40.5
15-24  24.1  19.7  23.6  26.4  41.8  36.6
25-34  23.5  21.7  26.2  27.6  43.3  41.6
35-44  18.8  17.1  21.3  28.6  38.2  34.7
45-54  20.2  13.7  16.0  24.1  35.2  29.7
55-64  27.6  15.6  14.5  31.6  42.6  41.7
65-74  35.0  23.6  18.3  37.0  47.6  45.0
75 & Over  47.5  37.7  22.1  47.9  41.4  45.9
All  26.1  20.6  23.0  30.5  42.5  39.4
Poverty Gap (in percent)  j/
0-4  21.2  14.8  14.2  20.4  24.9  29.6
5-9  18.7  13.6  12.9  17.6  24.8  27.5
10-14  19.5  13.2  12.4  18.6  23.6  25.9
15-24  18.7  14.1  12.8  18.5  24.1  28.4
25-34  20.1  13.6  13.5  20.3  25.8  28.0
35-44  17.7  13.5  12.6  18.7  24.1  27.6
45-54  17.0  12.9  13.6  20.8  24.8  30.0
55-64  19.2  13.9  14.5  21.4  26.1  32.5
65-74  20.6  14.4  14.2  22.0  28.5  35.2
75 &  Over  26.1  17.4  15.4  26.0  34.2  37.7
All  19.8  14.1  13.3  20.2  25.0  29.8
Source:  Household Expenditure and Income Date for Transition Economies Data Set (HEIDE).
Notes:
1/ The poverty gap is the poor's average shortfall in expenditures from the poverty line, expressed as a
percentage of the poverty line (this measure is also known as the expenditure gap ratio).
38Poverty incidence in Eastern Europe decreases with age, and reaches a minimum  at
ages 35-44 in Bulgaria, ages 45-54 in Hungary, and ages 55-64 in Poland.  After those
ages, the increase in poverty incidence is quite rapid and severe, except in Poland (as we
noted  earlier, this is due to  the generous pension  system in Poland).  In Bulgaria and
Hungary, poverty rates among people over 75  are close to  twice the national average.
The vast majority of people in that age group are women, and  their poverty rates are
higher than for the men in that group.  Actually, the gender-breakdown of Table 8 (not
shown here) reveals that poverty rates among the elderly are higher for women in general
than for men. At lower ages though, the gender gap is not very pronounced, and for some
ages poverty is lower among women than men.
Gender is thus a relevant poverty dimension in Eastern Europe primarily for the
elderly, especially  at very high ages, and for female-headed households.  For many women,
the labor market changes of transition have had major implications.  Prior to transition,
women were expected to work full-time but the state provided day care for their children.
Transition has led to a drop in female labor force participation (not all of it voluntarily) but
it has also led to a reduced supply of affordable day care centers (World Bank, 1996e)."
Both factors may well affect female-headed households disproportionately.
The  effect  oftransition on women  is discussed  further by Einhorn  (1993),  Funk  and Mueller  (1993),  Chase (1995)
and Fong (1996).
39Nevertheless,  the poverty  figures suggest that in general the age-effect  outweighs
the gender-effect. This is clear also from Table  9 which classifies  households  by the
number of  elderly people (over 65) in  the  household.  In Bulgaria and Hungary,
households  without elderly members  have below average poverty rates and those with
elderly members  have above average poverty incidence. The latter increases  with the
number  of elderly. Poland is again the exception,  where age proves to be an irrelevant
dimension  of poverty.  As discussed  previously,  Poland's pension system needs to be
credited  with this result.
Table 9:  Poverty and the Elderly
Number  of ElderlyMembers  Bulgaria Hungary  Poland  Estonia  Kyrgyz  Russia
(Over  Age 65) in the Household  Republic
Headcount (Po,  in percent)
0-  21.9  19.5  22.8  28.5  42.1  37.3
1  33.9  23.7  24.1  39.1  45.0  47.4
2  38.2  27.6  22.3  36.4  39.4  42.4
3 or more  ...  56.8  24.7  ...  ...  50.0
All  26.1  20.6  23.0  30.5  42.5  39.4
Poverty Gap (in percent) j/
0  19.1  13.9  13.3  19.6  25.0  28.8
1  22.2  15.2  13.5  23.6  24.3  32.7
2  18.5  13.7  13.2  17.5  29.2  32.1
3 or more  ...  7.4  13.9  ...  ...  58.4
All  19.8  14.1  13.3  20.2  25.0  29.8
Source: Household  Expenditure  and Income  Date for Transition  Economies  Data Set (HEIDE).
Notes:
V  The poverty  gap is the poor's average  shortfall  in expenditures  from the poverty  line, expressed  as a
percentage  of the poverty  line (this measure  is also  known as the expenditure  gap ratio).
40The poverty gap shows little variation by age, although it is above average among
people aged over  65.  It  does not  however increase systematically with the number of
elderly in  a  household.  In  fact, in Hungary,  it is  the reverse-the  poverty gap  falls
significantly  in households with two or three elderly members.  Many such households are
poor, but they are not very far below the poverty line.
a&  Former Soviet Union\
Poverty is generally considered to  have sharply increased in countries undergoing
transition,  partly because incomes are perceived to  have become  extremely unequally
distributed, and mostly as a result of drastic declines in GDP.  Indeed, a static comparison
of the poverty rates for the FSU suggests that poverty is a serious problem in Russia and
Estonia, and a nearly overwhelming one in the Kyrgyz Republic.
After  five years  of  economic contraction,  the  poor  in  the  FSU  appear  to  be
primarily the working poor, and especially the working poor with children.  The working
poor are testimony to the adjustment in wages, rather than in open unemployment, which
has  occurred.  The  myth  of  the  pensioner--he  idea  that  pensioners  are  especially
vulnerable to  poverty-is  belied by  several studies,  including this  one  (World  Bank,
various poverty assessments in transition economies), although it is true that the extremely
elderly (aged 75 and over) are more vulnerable to poverty.  This sketch of the poverty
profile seems relatively robust across equivalence scales-most  of the poverty assessments
cited used per capita measures, while in this study, the OECD equivalence scale is used.
41Regardless of equivalence assumptions about economies of scale in consumption, family
composition appears to have a major influence on the household's poverty status.
L  Pre-Transition Poverty  and Macroeconomic  Impact  of Transition
Poverty in the FSU was hidden and unacknowledged, but it was a fact of life for
approximately 6-10 percent of the population before the breakup of the country and the
embarkation on transitions to  the market  economy by  the FSU  countries (Braithwaite
1990, 1991,  1995).  Five  years  after gaining or  regaining independence, poverty  has
become much more overt and has increased in scope.  The large increases in measured
poverty  are  due  to  three  major  causes:  impact  of  severe  macroeconomic  declines
including hyperinflation; sharp increases in income  inequality; and  measurement error,
especially regarding  the  actual  distribution  of  real  consumption  in  the  pre-transition
period.
Any comparison to the pre-transition period is fraught with methodological pitfalls.
Even the extent of macroeconomic declines is difficult to  assess (Koen and Gavrilenko,
1994), although virtually no  one  would  disagree that  the  FSU  countries experienced
especially sharp contractions in output starting in 1992.  The hyperinflations experienced
in 1993-94 by most FSU countries meant that the real value of wages, pensions, and other
cash transfers plummeted abruptly.  The hyperinflations and the breakup of the ruble zone
led to macroeconomic disruption and a breakdown of the external trading relationships
among the FSU.  Without reasonable trading regimes and owing to  the necessity for a
complete realignment of production, real output declined precipitously.
42At the same time that the size of the pie shrunk, its distribution became markedly
more unequal.  The only statistics available are based on income and on the family budget
surveys, which are characterized by marked methodological shortcomings.  Nonetheless,
even a casual comparison suggests that the extent of open income inequality has become
quite  large  during  the transition  (Milanovic, Forthcoming;  Klugman  and  Braithwaite,
1998; Koen 1996, Commander, Tolstopiatenko, and Yemstov 1997).
A further complication stems from the prevalence of arrears in wages and pensions
in the FSU countries, and the irregular nature of even formal state-sector employment due
to forced administrative leave without pay and reduced working hours.  Since the breakup
of the  FSU, wage  and  cash transfer arrears  have become  common as  countries  have
grappled with the introduction of stabilization programs and fiscal austerity.  Budgetary
sequestration in Russia, Armenia, and Kyrgyz Republic resulted in long delays for wages
in  the  "budgetary  sphere"  (health,  education,  government/administration,  the  Armed
Forces,  law  enforcement,  etc.)  and  for  cash  transfers,  including pensions  and  child
allowances.
It  is difficult to  accurately measure "official" or  "registered"  income given the
prevalence of arrears, but  it is practically impossible to  quantify the  informal sector in
transition economies.  In the FSU countries, households have been extremely reluctant to
report  most of their income, even to  survey researchers, much less to the tax authorities.
(Koen and Gavrilenko, 1994).  Most studies suggest that the informal sector is around 40
percent of official GDP (KaufTmann  and Kaliberda, 1996).  In this study, total  reported
household income as a percent of total household expenditures varied from less than 50
43percent  in the  Kyrgyz Republic to  more than  95  percent  in  Estonia.  However,  the
difference between reported income and household expenditures is large enough to  mean
that conclusions about the distribution of consumption inferred from the distribution of
income are problematic.  This is one of the reasons why the poverty profile in this study is
based on household expenditures.
It is also futile to compare exactly the distribution of consumption before and after
transition.  During the pre-transition period, wages and prices were  controlled and food
and other consumer goods were allocated by queuing, rationing, and favoritism.  Neither
money  income  nor  money  expenditure  reflected  adequately  the  household's  real
consumption, since much of that real consumption was allocated to the household through
non-market,  non-money  means.-  For  example,  senior  workers  at  larger  enterprises
received better housing than junior workers at smaller enterprises, and they had  shorter
queues for purchasing automobiles, etc.  Without ever considering their money income, it
is clear that senior workers were better  off.  Unfortunately, there  is no reliable way to
reconstruct the real consumption of the poor and non-poor prior to transition, due to the
absence of reliable, non-biased household data sets.
IEL  Who are the Poor After  Five Years of Transition?
The working poor predominate in the poverty profile for the FSU countries.  By
and large, in Estonia, Russia, and the Kyrgyz Republic, the head of household of poor
families is employed, most often in the state sector.  Results indicate that poverty rates in
rural areas are much higher than in urban areas.
44Location
In most countries, where a family lives has a significant correlation with poverty.
In  the FSU  and  particularly Russia, there is a  strong  regional  component to  poverty,
relating to the legacy of the planned economy.  There are many one-company towns in the
FSU which produced military-industrial  goods for which demand has either disappeared or
sharply declined. Russia has its "rust belt" where textile production has been displaced by
competition from cheaper imports and service or other industry has not developed to fill in
this gap.  Additionally, the quality, irrigation, and altitude of agricultural land varies, which
means that rural poverty is not homogenous.
In all the countries compared in this paper, urban poverty is markedly lower than
rural poverty, and the poverty rate in the capital city is the lowest (except in Hungary,
Table  1).  For the  East European  countries, this  is a  conventional finding.  In many
countries of the world, the rural poverty rate is higher than the urban poverty rate, and the
higher living standards of urban regions were portrayed as the major explanation for rural-
urban migration many years ago (Harris and Todaro,  1970).  However conventional this
finding may be for Eastern Europe, it is not standard for the FSU.  In almost every World
Bank poverty assessment completed to  date for FSU  countries, rural poverty has been
found to be somewhat less or markedly less severe than urban poverty both in terms of the
headcount and in terms of various measures of severity.  12
12  World  Bank,  1995  a-c, 1996  a-d.
45The HEIDE  data set may lead to  different conclusions for two  reasons.  First,
conditions in the transition countries may have changed from the time period referenced
by  the Poverty  Assessments and that  covered by the HEIDE  data  base.  Second,  as
described in the methodological section, the HEIDE data base uses an equivalent adult
approach (which was not  usually followed in Poverty  Assessments),  a relative poverty
line, and relied on self-reporting for the value of food produced by the household for its
own consumption.  In most of the World Bank's  poverty assessments for the FSU, the
value of food produced on private plots was imputed, usually based on the purchase prices
reported by all the households in the sample. Imputing the value of food this way tends to
lead to  a higher consumption aggregate than asking  respondents  to  assess the  market
value of their food production.
In Estonia, there  is little difference between the  depth of  poverty in Talinn, the
capital, in other  cities, or in  rural areas as measured by the poverty  gap.  In Kyrgyz
Republic, the average poverty gap seems to be most affected by the higher poverty gap in
other cities, since there is little difference between the poverty rate in the capital and the
countryside.  In Russia, the poverty gap is highest in rural areas and noticeably lower in
the capital.
Family Composition
It  is  a  truism  of  poverty  studies that  family composition  is  one  of  the  most
significant correlates of poverty, since the number of earners and dependents has a critical
impact on the family's consumption needs and ability to fulfill those needs.  In the FSU,
however, family composition does not  correlate as strongly with poverty as it does in
46Eastern Europe or in many other countries of the world (Tables 2 and 3).  For example,
consider the issue of children.  In this study, children were defined to be under the age of
15, which corresponds to the statistical definition of labor activity previously used in the
FSU,  where  those  aged  0-14  were  assumed  to  be  outside  of  the  "available labor
resources" of the country.13
In most poor countries, families with children are worse off than families without
children, and families with more children are worse off than families with few children.
The first part of this generalization seems to  apply only weakly to  the FSU countries in
termns  of poverty rates, while the latter part seems to be clearly demonstrated in Estonia
and Russia, but only to a lesser extent in Kyrgyz Republic. Considering aggregated family
composition, in all three countries, families without children and without elderly members
are less likely (Kyrgyz Republic) or  much less likely (Estonia, Russia) to  be poor  than
families with either.  In Russia and Estonia, the highest poverty rates were experienced by
families with both  children and elderly members (52 and 35 percent, respectively).  The
Kyrgyz Republic showed the lowest  degree of variation of  poverty rates according to
family composition.
These findings are influenced by the  overall demographic characteristics of the
populations compared.  The Russian and Estonian populations are much more aged than
13  This definition  of "children"  as under  the age of 15 is arbitrary,  as are all definitions  that do not correspond  to the
age of legal majority,  which in most of the countries  in this study was 18.  However,  children aged 15-18  have
significant  economic  potential,  and in the FSU,  could usually  drop out of school  around  the age of 14 during the
period  wben  the surveys  were conducted.
47Kyrgyz Republic, and the birthrate in Estonia is even lower than that in Russia, which is
itself very  much lower than  the birthrate  in Kyrgyz Republic.  The  relative youth  of
Kyrgyz Republic population and the widespread prevalence of children means that very
few Kyrgyz Republic households are without at least one young dependent (14.4 percent),
while nearly half of families in Estonia (49.5) and Russia (44.5) do not have a child.
In Estonia, families with three adults and three children, single-parent families  with
one or more children, and single female adults have the highest poverty rates, but poverty
is most severe for single persons living alone.  In Estonia, the dependency burden is more
associated with care of the-elderly than for children.  Families with children comprised
only 53 percent of the poor, and families with two adults and any number of children had a
lower poverty rate than average.- In contrast, families with one or two elderly members
were poorer than average.  About 18 percent of the poor are aged 65 or above, and given
the differential male-female survival, approximately three-quarters of the elderly poor are
female (Table 8).
In Russia, out of all poor individuals, approximately 60 percent live in families  with
children, while slightly more  than 40  percent  live in childless homes.  However,  the
poverty  rates  and  gaps  are  higher for  single person  households than  in  single-parent
households and significantly higher than two-adult households with one or two children.
This is an unusual finding, and the fact that one of the highest poverty rates recorded was
for a single male adult family type is even more surprising. One would expect that a single
male adult would have no dependents and presumably would have a reasonable earnings
potential.  Age  only partly explains this finding, since two-thirds  of these  single male
48adults are younger  than 65.  For single Russian females, the poverty rate was high but so
too was the share (60 percent) aged 65 or older.
Other findings for Russia are more conventional.  Families with  three  or  more
children have the highest poverty rate in the sample (but  not the highest poverty gap).
Families without an  elderly member (aged 65 or  above) have a  much lower  rate  than
families with one or two elderly members. In Russia, more of the poor have children than
are responsible for  an elderly member.  However,  those  families with elderly members
have a higher poverty gap than families  with children.
In Kyrgyz Republic, a single female living alone was the household/family with the
highest poverty rate  and gap, followed by a many-child household with  only two  adult
members.  This is probably related to the situation of the elderly who do not comprise as
high as share of the poor  or total  population, due to  the younger age-structure  of the
population.  Additionally, in Kyrgyz Republic, having a child is fairly universal-only  14
percent of all families or of poor families  do not have at least one child.
Even though most families with two or three children are not poor, there  are so
many of such families in Kyrgyz Republic that they constitute the clear majority of the
poor-families  with three or more children comprise 53 percent of the poor, while families
with two or more children are 72 percent of the poor.  Such families are less likely to be
severely poor,  though,  as their poverty gaps are lower than those  of single females or
males, or interestingly enough, of two adults without children.
49Labor  Force Participation
Aside from the truism that the more income-earners in a household, the better off
the household is, there are some unexpected differences about the relationship between
labor force participation and  poverty in the FSU transition  economies relative to  other
countries.  The first difference is that in the FSU, participating in the labor force does not
always mean that the participant is paid anything at all.  Due to the pervasive wage and
cash  transfer arrears  (notably for  pensions, but  also for  child allowances),  the notion
"working poor" takes on a. whole  different meaning.  Indeed, there  are many who are
working poor but would not be poor if their salaries were paid, and there are pensioners
that would not be poor if their transfer payments were received on time.
In  1997, Russia announced a commitment to  clear pension arrears by the end of
the year.  Previously, and during the survey period studied here, pension arrears were
averaging anywhere between three and nine months, with some more remote areas having
much longer  lags  in  payment  than  in  the  well-off  areas  such  as  Moscow  and  St.
Petersburg.  On the other end of the spectrum, Estonia initiated a pension reform in 1993
which reduced differentiated pensions, eliminated pension payment arrears, and provided
for gradual increases in the retirement age.
In addition to arrears, the phenomenon of retaining workers by forcing them to
work reduced hours (short-time) or to be on unpaid administrative leave (forced leave)
was widespread in Russia and Kyrgyz Republic.
50A  second  difference between  the transition  economies  of  the  FSU  and  other
developing economies is that the stigma of reporting that one is out of work is arguably
greater, while the entitlement attitude that one deserves a pension or allowance is perhaps
larger than in other country contexts.  This is due to the legacy of the previous system, in
which labor was perceived as the right and obligation of anyone who was able-bodied, but
that those who had contributed previously to the labor market would be protected in old-
age or during periods of temporary "disability" (e.g. pregnancy or illness). These attitudes
are likely to evoke positive answers to  survey questions such as "do you work?" or "do
you have a job?"  in conditions which might receive negative answers in other country
contexts.  Nonetheless, unemployment rates calculated from the HEIDE data are higher
than both  registered  unemployment in the FSU  and  the rate  of unemployment benefit
receipts reported by HEIDE respondents, reflecting the extreme difficulty of qualifying for
an unemployment benefit and its short duration, especially in Russia and Kyrgyz Republic.
A third particular aspect of the  labor market  in the transition economies of the
FSU is that it is extremely in flux, as the private sector emerges, and the informal labor
market offers as many opportunities at the top  end of the scale as it does at the bottom.
Given the historic legacy in Russia and the other FSU  countries, where  entrepreneurial
behavior has always been regarded with extreme distrust, it is truly difficult to determine
the extent of entrepreneurial business and earnings. As a result, it is quite possible that the
number  of  respondents  who  report  that  they  work  in  the  private  sector  might  be
understated.  It mnight  be preferable for a person who has a state sector job "in name only"
to maintain that legal affiliation while in essence running a full-time business on the side.
51With  these  caveats  in  mind, the  conclusions about  poverty  and  labor market
participation for the FSU countries are rather conventional (Tables 4 and 5).  Households
with employed heads have lower poverty rates than those with unemployed heads, while
the addition of one or two household members who are unemployed sharply increases the
poverty rate.  In Estonia, a third unemployed member increases the poverty rate further,
but this is not the case in Russia and in Kyrgyz Republic, perhaps for some of the reasons
detailed above. However, all three countries demonstrated an increasing poverty gap with
each additional unemployed household member.
Some occupations or-socio-economic groups are associated with a lower poverty
rate than others.  In all three countries, self-employed household heads live in households
with-a lower poverty rate than average, as do heads who describe themselves as wage-
earners.  However, those self-employed heads who are poor are poorer  than average in
Estonia.  In all three countries, wage-earners live in households with a lower poverty gap.
Households with pensioners and other transfer recipients as household heads have sharply
higher poverty  rates  than  average,  but  their  average  shortfall  in  expenditures  is  not
markedly different from average.
Households with  access to  land-a  private plot-had  lower poverty  rates than
households  without  land,  and  the  poverty  gap  was  smaller,  in  Estonia  and  Kyrgyz
Republic (Table 10).  Unlike other studies of Russia (Klugman 1997, World Bank  1995b,
Kolev  1996), this  study found that Russian households with  a  plot were  poorer  than
households without.  As noted above, the change in methodology from imputing the value
52of private plot produce to relying  on self-valuation  may explain  partially  why this result
was obtained.
Table  10: Poverty  and  Ownership  of a Private  Plot
Whether  the household  has a  Bulgaria Hungary  Poland  Estonia  Kyrgyz  Russia
private plot  Republic
No plot  26.6  . 18.5  34.4  48.2  38.1
Has plot  25.6  ...  26.5  27.7  39.1  43.5
All  26.1  20.6  23.0  30.5  42.5  39.4
Poverty  Gap  (in percent)_1/
No plot  21.6  ...  13.6  21.4  28.1  29.1
Has  plot  17.2  ...  13.2  19.2  22.2  31.8
All  19.8  14.1  13.3  20.2  25.0  29.8
Source:  Household  Expenditure  and  Income  Date  for  Transition  Economies  Data  Set  (HEIDE).
Motes:
I/  The  povertv  gap is the  poor's  average  shortfall  in expenditures  from  the  poverty  line,  expressed  as a
percentage  of the  poverty  line  (this  measure  is also  known  as the expenditure  gap  ratio).
Education  of the household  head  has a strong  influence  on the household's  poverty
status, with the lowest headcounts  achieved  by those with university  education  (Table  6).
In all three countries, households  headed by those with primary education  or less than
complete  primary  education  had poverty  rates higher  than average,  and higher  than those
with secondary  education. The depth of poverty paralleled  the poverty rates, with the
highest  poverty  gaps for those with primary  or less education,  followed  by secondary  and
vocational-technical  education. The poverty gaps for those poor with higher education
were  below  average.
53Gender and Children
Unlike most  of the World Bank's  poverty assessments, this study suggests that
gender is a  significant dimension of poverty (Table 7) in the FSU.  In the three  FSU
countries, the poverty rate was sharply higher in households headed by women as opposed
to  men, with this  difference being largest in Estonia and  smallest in Kyrgyz Republic.
Additionally, female-headed  households  were  poorer  than  comparable  male-headed
households  as  their  poverty  gaps  were  larger,  although  this  difference  was  not  as
pronounced as the difference in poverty rates.
Given the differential survival rates of women and men, for all three countries,
women comprise an increasing share of those who are poor as age increases.  Half or even
less than half of poor children are girls, but by age 65 and over, women are approximately
70-75 percent of the poor.  The elderly aged 65 and above are also poorer than average,
as measured by the poverty gap.  This means that elderly female poverty is more pervasive
as well as deeper than male poverty in the Former Soviet Union.
4.  Multivariate Analysis of Welfare and Poverty
The goal of the multivariate analysis of welfare and poverty is to assess the relative
importance of various correlates of poverty and if possible, to attribute causality to these
correlates.  Additionally, determinants of welfare such as the demographic characteristics
of households and the return to  household assets, may differ between the poor and the
non-poor, and the multivariate analysis  will help to elucidate these differences. As was the
case with  the two-dimensional examination of poverty  in the poverty  cross-tabulation
54tables, by and large, these goals were better met by results for the East European
countries. Almost  all the variables  included  in the models for the East European  countries
have estimated  parameters significantly  different  from zero, and the pattern of results is
very consistent across the three East European countries.  Thus, while there remain
important  unidentified  welfare  determinants  (e.g. personal  ability),  the model  does point  at
a set of significant  factors  which affect  welfare  outcomes  and which  can be identified  and
affected  in the context of policy  intervention  to alleviate  poverty  in Eastern  Europe.
Unfortunately,  the results are not so clear for the FSU.  Overall, the explanatory
power  of the welfare regressions  is low, and it is difficult  to find as many clear poverty
correlates  as for the East European  countries. In several  ways, it can be argued  that such
a finding  is not surprising,  and relates  to the different  degrees  of the transition  process. In
particular, the FSU still lacked much open unemployment  during the HEIDE survey
periods, although there was a  strong correlation between actual unemployment  and
poverty. Further,  in the FSU the labor market and especially  the private sector are not
well-defined,  and it is difficult  to determine  a priori who are likely  to be the losers and
winners, since  many of  the  traits  associated with  winning in  the  new  regimes
(entrepreneurial  skills,  political  connections)  are extremely  difficult  to measure  reliably  by
a household  survey. However,  those aspects  which could be measured  in the household
surveys  (access  to a household  business  or private plot) were strongly  associated  with the
ability  of a household  to avoid  poverty  in the FSU.
55A.  Eastern Europe
Welfare Equations
Several  general  observations  emerge  from  the  estimation  results  in  Table 11.
While moderate, the overall goodness-of-fit is in line with typical results for this type of
equation (l 2 ranges from 0.267 to  0.301).  The reported results  are for the log-linear
functional form.  These were compared against the results from the linear form, using the
test developed fof that purpose by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981).  In each case the test
results pointed at the superiority of the log-linear specification. This implies that effects of
household characteristics on welfare are proportional rather than linear.  For example, the
effect of education is to increase expenditure per equivalent adult in a fixed proportion,
rather than with a fixed amount (i.e. the absolute returns are lower for the poor).
56Table 11:  Welfare Equations (OLS): East European Countries
Dependent Variable = In (household  expenditure per equivalent adult)
Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland
Parameter  Standard  Parameter  Standard  Parameter  Standard
Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error
Intercept  8.558*  0.122  9.424*  0.042  7.556*  0.036
Number of children  -0.064*  0.013  -0.075*  0.005  -0.091*  0.003
Number of male adults  -0.065*  0.015  -0.012  0.007  -0.022*  0.005
Number of female adults  -0.039*  0.014  -0.011  0.007  -0.017*  0.005
Number of elderly  -0.084*  0.020  -0.039*  0.010  -0.025*  0.007
Educationofhead:  primary  -0.235*  0.024  -0.228*  0.011  -0.195*  0.008
Education of head: vocational/technical  0.066*  0.037  -0.109*  0.011  -0.098*  0.008
Educationofhead:  university  0.117*  0.029  0.135*  0.014  0.207*  0.011
Age of head  0.021*  0.005  0.017*  0.002  0.011*  0.001
Age of head squared  -0.000*  0.000  -0.000*  0.000  -0.000*  0.000
Female head  -0.117*  0.025  -0.063*  0.009  -0.058*  0.007
Householdownsenterprise  0.321*  0.043  0.163*  0.015  0.229*  0.014
Household owns land  0.178*  0.022  - - 0.033*  0.007
Household is renter  -0.326*  0.038  -0.173*  0.010  -0.047*  0.007
Shareofwagesinhouseholdincome  0.318*  0.036  0.172*  0.018  0.141*  0.012
Number of unemployed  in household  - - -0.102*  0.009  -0.120*  0.007
Head is unemployed  - - - -
Head is inactive  - - -0.035*  0.017  -0.007  0.011
Location: non-capital city  -0.140*  0.027  0.017  0.010  -0.095*  0.011
Location: village  -0.246*  0.033  -0.007  0.011  -0.198*  0.013
Number of observations  2465  8104  16,050
R2 (adjusted)  0.288  0.301  0.267
F-statistic  63.39*  205.56*  325.47*
Note:  * Indicates that estimated paraneters  are significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level.
57The general pattern of findings is that education and the ownership of a household
enterprise have the largest effects on welfare outcomes,  followed by the nature  of the
household's  link with the labor market.  Demographic characteristics are a distant third.
Some  countries (Bulgaria)  show strong  location effects, while others  (Hungary)  show
almost none.
In  Bulgaria,  ownership  of  a  household  enterprise,  owning  one's  home,  and
deriving all household income from wages each imply increases of household welfare in
excess of 30 percent.  No single variable has such high welfare premium attached to it in
Hungary or  Poland.  In Hungary,  the strongest  effect  comes from  primary education
(negative  23 percent  relative  to  the  reference  category  of  secondary  education).
Enterprise and  home ownership, and a wages-only  income each add  16-17 percent to
household welfare.  In Poland, the strongest welfare determinant is also a home enterprise
(23 percent), but wage-income and home ownership have smaller effects (14 percent and
5 percent, respectively).
The  results  clearly  indicate  the  key  role  played  by  education  in  transition
economies.  In Bulgaria, households where the head did not achieve more than primary
education, have a  welfare level 23.5  percent  below that  of the  reference category  (a
household where the  head has secondary education).  This  welfare "penalty"  for low
education is similar in the other two  countries.  Vocational and technical education is
associated with a small welfare gain in Bulgaria, relative to secondary education, but with
a welfare loss in Hungary and Poland.  The likely explanation is that Bulgaria is not yet as
far advanced in its transition as the other two countries, and still has many unconvertedstate industries where the pre-transition vocational and technical education continues to
have a high pay-off.  The conversion process in the other countries has put a premium on
job  flexibility, and  the  more  general  secondary  education  and  especially  university
education  have proven  to  lend themselves better  to  the  needed  adaptation.  This  is
reflected in the higher coefficients for university education in Hungary and Poland relative
to Bulgaria.
These results underscore the crucial importance of general education (especially
post-secondary education) for a  successful long-term strategy in coping with transition.
The huge gaps in the return to  education between the primary and higher levels point at
the unequalizing effect on the distribution of household welfare which is likely to result
from transition.  It is not practically possible to "upgrade" people's education in the short
run-particularly  since almost 2/3 of heads of households in the East European countries
have  primary  or  vocational/technical  education  levels.  These  households  will
progressively fall behind as transition proceeds,  unless they can be  re-schooled or  re-
trained.  There is evidence that following transition the distribution of wages has become
more unequal in Eastern Europe (Milanovic, 1995), and our results indicate that this effect
from education extends to the overall distribution of household welfare as well.
The poverty profiles earlier in this paper, as well as other analyses of poverty in
Eastern Europe (Grootaert,  1995, 1997a) have highlighted the strong correlation between
poverty and open unemployment. Unemployment is perhaps the most visible aspect of the
social cost  of  transition  and  it has  severe distributional implications.  The results  in
Table 11 indicate that over and above other household attributes (some of which, such as
59iow education, increase in themselves the probability to be unemployed), the presence of
an unemployed household member reduces household welfare  by  10-12 percent.'4 A
significant number of households in Eastern Europe  have more  than one  unemployed
member.
As one can expect, household size is negatively related to household welfare (since
we defined the latter as household expenditure per equivalent adult).  However, what is of
interest  is  the  role  of  household  composition,  as  reflected  in  the  magnitude  of  the
coefficients for  each type of  household member.  Except  for  Bulgaria,  the  strongest
negative  coefficient is  found  for  the  number  of  children.  The  implication is  that
households do not succeed in maintaining their welfare levels when the number of children
increases-in  spite of the generous social transfers in Eastern Europe and the presence of
general  entitlement programs  such  as  the  family allowances  which  are  targeted  on
children.  Given the positive correlation between household size and poverty, it may well
be  needed  that  child-oriented  transfer  programs  move  away  from  being  general
entitlements to  being more poverty-targeted  by paying larger amounts to  poor  families
with children.
The pattern  of  the  coefficients of the  other  demographic variables  is  country
specific.  With respect  to  age  of the  head of  household,  each of  the  three  countries
indicates an inverted-U life-cycle pattern with welfare levels rising over most of the adult
4  One can assume that the effect is the most severe if the head of household  is unemployed. Grootaert  (1997a)
contains some  evidence  to that effect for Hungary. Since  the household  head was defined  as the main earner in
the Poland  and Hungary  household  surveys  used for the HEIDE  database,  few  heads of household  are classified  as
unemployed  for  those countries.
60age-range, and then falling in the elderly years.  The turning points are 49 years of age for
Bulgaria, 53 years for Hungary, and 68 years for Poland.  This may suggest differential
effectiveness of  the  pension  system  to  maintain  welfare  levels.  We  discussed  the
generosity of the Polish pension system previously, but other factors likely play a role,
including private  transfers  and  the  ability (and  willingness) of  retired  people  to  earn
secondary incomes.
In each of the three countries, female-headed households have a  lower welfare
than male-headed households who are similar in all other characteristics.  The shortfall
ranges from 5.8 percent in Poland to  11.7 percent in Bulgaria.  There appears to  be a
coincidence of demographic factors.  In Poland, old age clearly matters least in terms of its
impact on welfare levels (the age turning point is highest, and the coefficient of "number
of elderly" in the household composition variables is lowest) and this is also the case for
gender effects. In contrast, Bulgaria has the strongest age and gender effects, two to three
times larger than those observed in Poland.
Lastly, we need to point at the country-specific location effects.  In Hungary, the
large  welfare  differences across  locations  are  fully explained by  the  distribution  of
demographic and economic characteristics of households, and residual location effects are
not  statistically different from zero.  In Bulgaria and Poland, in contrast, large location
effects remain.  Relative to the capital city, households living in other cities have a 10-14
percent  lower welfare level, and those  in villages are 20-25 percent  lower,  even after
controlling for  all household characteristics included in the model.  This suggests that
economic and social infrastructure, as well as other supply factors of economic activity,
61have important locational inequalities.  Indeed, it has been a characteristic of much of the
transition in Eastern  Europe that  certain regions, such as  those  with traditional  heavy
industry, have suffered the most from transition due to the impossibility to convert such
industries  to  privately-owned  competitive firms.  Similarly, the  conversion  of  state-
controlled agriculture to private farns  has not happened without loss of income to  many
farmers (Milanovic, 1995).
Poverty Equations
As  we  discussed in  Section 2,  we  are concerned  about  the  effect  of  possible
measurement error of household expenditure which could be correlated with some of the
explanatory variables in the model (e.g. educated people report  household expenditures
more accurately; older people have more difficulty with reporting; households with self-
employment income try to hide income and expenditure for fear of taxation).  This could
bias the coefficients of the welfare equation estimated by OLS.  There is also a concern
about the extent to which a given functional form fits the distribution.  For both reasons,
we estimated poverty equations with a binary dependent variable (poor/non-poor)  using
probit techniques.  The consistency, or  lack thereof, of  probit results with the welfare
equation results serves as a test for the presence of measurement-error or functional-form-
fit problems.
The results in Table 12 suggest that the binary model provides a good  fit.  The
model correctly classifies 77 percent to 82 percent of households as poor or non-poor, and
as was the case with the OLS-model, almost all of the included variables have estimated
coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level.  Table 12
62Table 12:  Poverty Equations (Probit): East European  Countries
Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland
Probability  Standard  Probability  Standard  Probability  Standard
Derivatives  Error  Derivatives  Error  Derivatives  Error
Number of children  0.039*  0.013  0.056*  0.006  0.062*  0.003
Number of male adults  0.052*  0.015  0.012  0.008  0.013*  0.004
Numberoffemaleadults  0.018  0.015  -0.006  0.008  0.004  0.005
Number of elderly  0.055*  0.020  0.020*  0.010  0.015*  0.007
Educationofhead:  primary  0.171*  0.024  0.188*  0.014  0.161*  0.010
Education of head: vocational/technical  -0.056  0.037  0.077*  0.016  0.076*  0.009
Education of head: university  -0.085*  0.029  -0.09l*  0.015  -0.094*  0.010
Age of head  -0.014*  0.004  -0.016*  0.002  -0.008  0.001
Age of head squared  0.000*  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000*  0.000
Female head  0.113*  0.027  0.031*  0.011  0.027*  0.007
Household owns enterprise  -0.169*  0.028  -0.078*  0.014  -0.102*  0.008
Household owns land  -0.131*  0.021  - - -0.029*  0.008
Household is renter  0.244*  0.047  0.172*  0.015  0.020*  0.007
Share of wages in household income  -0.272*  0.037  -O.136*  0.021  -0.122*  0.012
Number of unemployed in household  - 0.075*  0.010  0.078*  0.007
Head is unemployed  - - - -
Head is inactive  - - -0.001  0.018  -0.022*  0.010
Location: non-capital city  0.029  0.029  -0.037*  0.012  0.018  0.014
Location: village  0.128*  0.037  -0.002  0.013  0.092*  0.017
Log-likelihood  -1199.3  -3418.7  -6677.6
Chi-squared  503.95  1381.3  2291.7
Prob > chi-squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
percent correct predictions  76.6  81.22  81.63
Note:  * Indicates significance of the underlying coefficient at 90 percent level probability.  Derivatives are taken at the mean values of continuous
variables or for discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1.
63does not report the probit coefficients, but the probability derivatives at the mean of each
continuous explanatory variable and for a change from zero to one in the case of dummy
variables.  The estimation used  non-poor  as  the base  category,  hence the  derivatives
pertain to the probability to be poor.
Substantively, the pattern of determinants of poverty is entirely consistent with the pattern
of determinants of welfare that was revealed by the welfare regression.  All factors which
are correlated with an increase/decrease in welfare are correlated with a decrease/increase
in the probability to be poor.  Hence, qualitatively the poverty regression adds nothing to
the  findings  from  the  welfare  regression.  However,  there  are  some  quantitative
differences, in terms of the relative magnitude of the effects.  This is to  be expected of
course, since the poverty regression uses different information than the welfare regression.
A case in point is the effect of education in Poland.  In the welfare regression, university
education was  associated  with  a  21  percent  welfare  premium  relative  to  secondary
education, while primary education was associated with a welfare reduction of 20 percent,
i.e. the  two  levels of education  had  symmetrical welfare effects around  the  reference
category.  In  contrast,  primary  education  increases  the  probability to  be  poor  by
16 percentage points relative to secondary education, but university education reduces it
by  only  9 percentage  points.  In  other  words,  university  education  is  an  important
determinant of where on the welfare distribution a household will end up, and it has large
absolute returns, but it has a lesser role as a determinant of poverty.
There are several similar patterns in the shift of relative roles of variables between
the welfare regression and the poverty regression.  These shifts have implications for the
64targeting  and  design  of  poverty  alleviation interventions.  Foremost  is  the  role  of
household  enterprises.  In Bulgaria and  Poland,  ownership  of  a  household  enterprise
makes the largest or  second largest positive contribution to  household welfare-a  clear
reflection  of  the  post-transition  emergence  of  the  small-scale private  sector.  These
enterprises do reduce the probability that the household is poor, but the estimated effects
are smaller than several other variables such as education or the share of wages.  The
contribution of household enterprises is hence more important in the upper  part of the
distribution, and one characteristic of the poor in transition economies is that they have
not yet successfully  got involved in the private sector as entrepreneurs.
Important differences between the welfare and poverty regressions also occur in
the demographic and location variables.  While both models underscore the correlation
between  number of  children and low welfare or  poverty, they fail to  do  so for  other
categories of household members. E.g. in Bulgaria and Poland, additional female adults in
the household are associated with lower household welfare, but this does not increase the
probability to be poor.  In Bulgaria, the coefficient for  male adults stands out  as much
higher than in other countries, and could indicate the difficulties in that country for men in
their prime earning years to find adequately paid employment.
The results for location also deserve highlighting. The degree to which regional or
locational targeting of poverty interventions is desirable and useful is frequently a major
issue.  The answer is different for each country but it is important to underline that the
answer given by the  welfare regressions is not  the same as that  given by the  poverty
regression.  This is simply saying that the geographic distribution of welfare is not the
65same as the geographic distribution of poverty.  1 5 Specifically, in Bulgaria and Poland, the
probability to be poor does not differ between the capital city and other urban areas (after
controlling for all other variables), even though the latter areas have significantly lower
welfare levels.  In  the rural  areas of these  two  countries, however,  there is  a higher
probability to  be poor, which is consistent with  a negative welfare effect.  Hungary is
unique in that, certeris paribus, the probability to be poor is less outside the capital city.
Poverty Gap Equations
Table 13 presents  Tobit estimation results  for  the  right-censored  subsample of
poor households.  As we discussed in Section 2, this model is conceptually equivalent to
estimating  the  determinants  of  the  poverty  gap  (i.e.  the  depth  of  poverty).  The
coefficients reported  in Table 13 are directly comparable to  the OLS coefficients of the
welfare model which was estimated over the full sample (see Table 11).  This comparison
provides a test whether constant parameters apply for the entire welfare distribution.  It is
clear that for the majority of variables this hypothesis is rejected:  returns to  assets and
contributions to  welfare from other household characteristics are not  the same for the
poor and the non-poor.  In most cases, the coefficients are higher for the poor than for the
full sample.
5 This  result is clearly  sensitive  to where exactly  the poverty  line is set.
66Table 13: Poverty  Gap Equations (Tobit):  East European  Countries
Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland
Dependent Variable: In (Erpenditure per  Parameter  Standard  Parameter  Standard  Parameter  Standard
Equivalent Adult) Right-Censored at Poverty  Estimates  Error  Estimates  Error  Estimates  Error
Line
Intercept  8.559*  0.184  9.273*  0.060  7.417*  0.055
Number of children  -0.085*  0.020  -0.078*  0.007  -0.093*  0.005
Number of male adults  -0.098*  0.023  -0.009  0.011  -0.027*  0.007
Number of female adults  -0.056*  0.023  0.003  0.011  -0.004  0.007
Number of elderly  -0.077*  0.031  -0.018  0.014  -0.02l*  0.011
Education of head:  primary  -0.285*  0.039  -0.252*  0.018  -0.225*  0.014
Education of head:  vocational/technical  0.142*  0.071  -0.095*  0.020  -0.106*  0.013
Educationofhead:  university  0.171*  0.057  0.164*  0.032  0.207*  0.028
Age of head  0.024*  0.007  0.022*  0.002  0.012*  0.002
Age of head squared  -0.000*  0.000  -0.000*  0.000  -0.000*  0.000
Female head  -0.173*  0.038  -0.038*  0.014  -0.042*  0.010
Household owns enterprise  0.355*  0.090  0.132*  0.028  0.236*  0.026
Household owns land  0.280*  0.035  - - 0.055*  0.013
Household is renter  -0.346*  0.055  -0.207*  0.015  -0.025*  0.011
Share of wages in household income  0.528*  0.060  0.199*  0.029  0.220*  0.018
Number of unemployed in household  - - -0.115*  0.012  -0.114*  0.010
Head is unemployed  - - - -
Head is inactive  - - 0,007  0.024  0.045*  0.016
Location: non-capital city  -0.035  0.046  0.055*  0.016  -0.031  0.022
Location: village  -0.231*  0.053  -0.005  0.017  -0.142*  0.024
Log-likelihood  -1178.5  -2580.1  -5345.9
Chi-squared  595.31  1501.56  2368.6
Prob > chi-squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000
SER  0.527  0.351  0.390
Note:  * Indicates that coefficient  is significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence level.
67With  respect  to  education,  the  main  difference  is  that  the  welfare  penalty
associated  with  having completed only primary  education,  or  conversely,  the  welfare
benefit of secondary over primary education, is larger for the poor than for the population
at  large.  It  ranges  from  22.5  percent  in  Poland  to  28.5  percent  in  Bulgaria  (the
corresponding  figures  for  the  full sample were  19.5 percent  and  23.5  percent).  In
Bulgaria,  the  welfare  gain  for  the  poor  from  vocational/technical  education  is  14.2
percent, against only 6.6 percent  for  the whole  population.  In  Hungary  and Poland,
vocational  and technical education  lead to  lower  welfare levels relative  to  secondary
education, and here the differences between the poor and the non-poor  are small.  The
returns to university education are not different for the poor and non-poor in Poland, but
in the other two countries the returns are much higher for the poor.  All this suggests that
re-schooling and  re-training could have  potentially high  pay-offs in  the  context  of  a
poverty alleviation program.
The returns to land ownership are also higher for the poor,  especially in Bulgaria.
The returns from ownership of a household enterprise-already  the single most important
welfare determinant for the population at large-are  higher still for the poor in Bulgaria
-and Poland (but lower in Hungary).  Clearly, the ability to  participate successfully in the
informal private  sector  is the key  factor  to  reduce  the  depth  of poverty  in the  East
European countries considered here, and programs to  promote private entrepreneurship
are probably the most important ingredient in active labor market policies, from the point
of view of poverty reduction.  Of course, the results also suggest that obtaining a wage job
is an equally or even more successful road towards reducing the poverty gap-the  wage-
68share variable has much higher coefficients for the poor than for the entire population.  In
Bulgaria, each increase in the share of wages in total income of 10 percentage points is
linked with  a  rise  in  household  expenditure per  equivalent adult  of  5.3 percent.  In
Hungary and Poland, the corresponding figures are 2.0 percent and 2.2 percent.
As  far  as  demographic  characteristics  are  concerned,  the  lower  welfare
experienced by female-headed households amounts to  17.3 percent for poor households in
Bulgaria, against 11.7 percent for the population at large.  In Hungary and Poland though,
the welfare gap between female-headed and male-headed households is less for the poor
than  for  the  population.  The  welfare  burden  stemming  from  large  households  is
significantly greater for the poor than for the non-poor in Bulgaria, but the evidence is
mixed in other countries.  Lastly, the location effects are smaller for the poor in Bulgaria
and  Poland,  but  larger  in Hungary.  This  could reflect a  greater  effectiveness of  the
Hungarian social safety net in reaching the poor living outside the capital city.
In summary, the general finding from the poverty gap  equations, in comparison
with the welfare equations estimated over the full population, is that returns to human and
physical capital are often higher for the poor than for the non-poor and that the promotion
of  access to  such capital and  upgrading of capital owned  by  households are sensible
components  of  poverty  reduction  strategies  in  Eastern  Europe.  The  role  of  other
variables, especially household composition and location, also differs between the poor
and non-poor, but the pattern of differences is country-specific.
On the methodological front, these results call for a certain amount of caution in
using welfare regressions estimated over the full sample as a basis for poverty analysis.
69Our results suggest that one of the basic assumptions of this practice, the constancy of
parameters  over  the  entire  distribution, may not  hold  for  a  number  of  key variables,
especially household assets.
B.  Former Soviet  Union
Welfare Equations
For consistency and also owing to a lack of specifications which perfonned better,
the same specification for the OLS model used for Eastern Europe was used for the FSU.
In general, the overall goodness-of-fit for the FSU countries is much lower than for the
Eastern European countries, as shown by the R2 measures reported in Table 14.  The R 2
for Estonia is the only one close to the lower boundary for the East European countries,
while the explanatory power  of the equation is quite low for both  Russia and Kyrgyz
Republic.  Most but not all of the determinants of welfare included in the specification had
estimated parameters significantly  different from zero, but there was no discernible pattern
to these differences.  For all the FSU countries, the number of children, female-headed
household, household ownership of an enterprise, the share of wages in household income,
university education of the head, and the location dummy variables were  significant in
determining expenditures per equivalent adult.  These significant factors are in most cases,
easy to measure, and can serve as the basis for policy interventions.
70Table 14:  Welfare Equations (OLS): FSU Countries
Dependent Variable = In (household expenditure per equivalent adult)
Estonia  Kyrgyz  Republic  Russia
Parameter  Standard  Parameter  Standard  Parameter  Standard
Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error
Intercept  7.301  0.089  9.627*  0.191  1.068*  0.120
Number  of children  -0.080*  0.012  -0.060*  0.013  -0.123*  0.015
Number  of male adults  -0.057*  0.021  -0.029  0.023  -0.030  0.022
Number  of female  adults  0.011  0.017  0.025  -0.022  0.019  0.020
Number  of elderly  -0.047  0.022  -0.061  0.041  -0.021  0.025
Education  of head: primary  -0.076*  0.023  0.045  0.060  -0.084*  0.036
Education  of head: vocational/technical  ...  ...  0.102*  0.059  0.034  0.030
Education  of head: university  0.214*  0.028  0.158*  0.060  0.147*  0.037
Age of head  -0.003  0.004  0.017*  0.009  0.010*  0.004
Age  of head  squared  0.000  0.000  -0.000*  0.000  -0.000  0.000
Female  head  -0.103*  0.028  -0.191*  0.056  -0.141*  0.032
Household  owns  enterprise  0.174*  0.022  0.160*  0.042  0.235*  0.041
Household  owns land  0.160*  0.021  0.249*  0.040  -0.043  0.029
Household  is renter  -0.122*  0.019  0.064  0.070  0.024  0.026
Share of wages in household  income  0.329*  0.032  0.205*  0.066  0.297*  0.040
Number  of unemployed  in household  -0.189*  0.026  ...  ...  -0.240*  0.038
Head is unemployed  . ...  ...  -0.148*  0.071  ...
Head is inactive  -0.119*  0.026  -0.056  0.061  -0.149*  0.037
Location: non-capital  city  -0.196*  0.022  -0.338*  0.059  -0.365*  0.037
Location: village  -0.311*  0.028  -0.504*  0.059  -0.428*  0.043
Number  of observations  2817  1929  5147
R2(adjusted)  0.256  0.103  0.115
F-statistic  57.95*  13.26*  38.08*
Note: * Indicates  that estimated  parameters  are significantly  different  from zero  at the 90% confidence  level.
71As was the case  for Eastern Europe,  testing the log-linear  specification  against  the
linear  form (Davidson  and MacKinnon,  1981) demonstrated  that the log-linear  form was
preferred.  This means, for example, that the effect of adding an additional  child is to
decrease household welfare (expenditure  per equivalent adult) in a  fixed proportion,
implying  that the absolute  costs of adding  a child  are lower  for the poor.
In the FSU, locational factors have the strongest effect on household welfare,
followed by the  share of wages in household income, whether the household has a
household  enterprise,  and higher education. These general  findings  are discussed  in detail
below.
In the FSU, the strongest effects on welfare were related to household  location,
with the sharpest change in household  welfare (increasing  it by 50 percent) implied  by
moving  from a rural area to the capital in Kyrgyz  Republic. Even moving  from an urban
area to the capital,  Bishkek,  would  increase  household  welfare  by one-third. The location
effects are nearly as strong in Russia (43 percent rural-to-capital,  37 percent urban-to-
capital)  and not inconsiderable  in Estonia (with rural-to-capital  shifts  increasing  welfare  by
nearly  one-third).
The dominant role of location, especially  location in the capital city, has been
documented  in other FSU countries  such as Armenia  and Ukraine (World Bank 1996a,
1995c).  In many ways, this finding demonstrates  the slowness of transition and of
business-encouraging  reforms and private sector development,  as well as questions of
scale  in many small  FSU countries. Aside  from Russia  (and possibly  Ukraine) most FSU
countries are  quite small in terms of population and GDP, so most private sector
72development has been concentrated in the capital cities (which are often the only cities of
any appreciable size).
The next most significant  factors for increasing household welfare in the FSU were
the household's entrepreneurial activity, either through owning an enterprise or farming a
private plot of land, and the household's link to the labor market, as proxied by the share
of wages in total household income.  However, the ranking of these factors was country-
specific. In Estonia,  land ownership and owning an enterprise was significant but most
important was the share of wages in household income, which can increase welfare by
one-third.  In Russia, land ownership was not  significant,' 6 but  the  share  of wages  in
household  income  and  ownership  of  household  businesses  were  important,  raising
household welfare 30 and 24 percent  respectively. In Kyrgyz Republic, after  location,
ownership of a private plot had the largest effect on welfare, increasing it by 25 percent,
while-household welfare increased 20 percent from increasing participation in the official
economy (as captured by an increase in the share of wages in total household income).
In  all  three  countries,  the  presence  of  an  unemployed  household  head  (or
household member) was found to significantly  decrease household welfare.  In Estonia and
Russia, specifications based on the number of unemployed demonstrated that  adding an
unemployed household member reduced household welfare per equivalent adult between
16  Ths is possibly  due to recordinWmeasurement  errors for this variable which is carried  in the data set as hectares
of land held by the household. When the raw data were examined, there were several improbable  outliers.
Unfortunately,  removing  these outliers did not significantly  improve  perfornance, nor did the subsitutation  of a
dummy  variable for land ownership. The dummy variable did perform better in Russia than the number of
hectares, so it was retained.  Sonewhat similar measurement  problems  also plagued the Kyrgyz  Republic  data
(the two surveys  were conducted  by the same consulting  group), but the dununy variable was significant  for
Kyrgyz  Republic. In Estomia,  a different  survey  and methodology  recorded  only  whether  the household  had access
to land, not  the amount  of hectares.
7315 and 20 percent, respectively. In Kyrgyz  Republic,  the dummy  variable  for household
head performed  better (partly  because of the lower number of "unemployed"  in Kyrgyz
Republic, where many family members work on  the same private plot and are thus
automatically  not counted as unemployed)  and resulted in reductions of welfare in the
order of those in Russia.  Additionally,  in Russia and in Estonia, households  headed by
individuals  not in the  labor force (inactive heads) were associated with declines in
household  welfare  of 15 and 12 percent,  respectively.
The final significant  factor was whether the  household head had university
education. In all three countries,  welfare gains were approximately  15-20 percent.  In
Estonia  and Russia,  primary  education  of the head was also significant  and in the expected
(negative)  direction,  reducing  household  welfare  about 8 percent in both cases. In Kyrgyz
Republic,  vocational-technical training  was  also  associated  with  improved
welfare-having  a  household head with it would raise household welfare 10 percent
relative  to a household  head with secondary  education. In Russia, however,  vocational-
technical  did  not have a significantly  different  return from secondary  education.  7
Demographic  factors,  except  for the number  of children  and female  headship,  were
generally  not very important  for household  welfare in the three FSU countries. In each
case, adding children meant reducing household  welfare, from a  low of a  6 percent
reduction  in Kyrgyz  Republic  to a 12 percent reduction  in Russia. In Russia,  there was a
17  For Estonia,  data on household  heads with vocational-technical  education  were combined  with households  with
general secondary  education. Although  the base data set for Estoma  did have a very few individual  household
heads with vocational-education,  they were few in number  and their welfare  level improbably  high. It is possible
that these households should have been classified elsewhere, but it was not possible to discern the exact
definition  differences  that led to the non-comparability.
74system of generalized child allowances but there were significant payment arrears and the
take-up rate was low.  Of families  with children under 18, only 60 percent reported receipt
of a child allowance (World Bank, 1995b).  In Kyrgyz Republic, budgetary sequestration
resulted in a withdrawal of the child allowance in  1994, and the substitution of a new
benefit, the common monthly subsidy.  In Estonia,  fiscal austerity  resulted in  flat-rate
pensions in 1993 and a withdrawal of social assistance benefits inherited from the Soviet
Union.
In Russia and Kyrgyz Republic, increases in the age of the household head were
associated with small increases in household welfare, but  only in Kyrgyz Republic was
there a  discernible U-shaped life-cycle pattern.  Other  demographic variables were not
significant,  except for the number of adult males in Estonia.
Overall, these results underscore the critical role of the labor market in determining
household welfare in the FSU.  Those households, who have been able to most effectively
capture the returns from their own labor and effort in owing family businesses or private
plots, have been able to stay out of poverty.  Individuals with university education seem to
have been best suited to capture the new possibilities as domestic markets have opened up
and economic control and regulation relaxed.
The  importance  of  location, household  participation in  the  labor  market,  and
education  in  affecting household  welfare  presents  formidable  challenges to  country
authorities seeking to reduce poverty.  and to keep poor households from becoming poorer.
Whether a household has a private plot or university-educated head are not easy factors to
change in the short  run, while the extreme locational disparities are so  large as to  be
75unlikely to  be  rectified in  even the  longer term.  However,  the  importance of
entrepreneurial  activity for increasing  household  welfare may very well be fostered by
steps in the short- and medium-term,  perhaps including  public works and micro credit
programs. In Russia, where non-governmental  organizations  have been especially  active
(Nizhnyy  Novgorod, Yekaterinburg),  credit unions and small business incubators have
been  set up.
Poverty Equations
Given the difficulties  of conducting  household  surveys in the FSU (high refusal
rates, extremely  high reluctance  to  reveal sensitive  information  on income and alcohol
consumption),  it is not surprising  that measurement  error is a significant  concern for the
data sets on Estonia, Russia, and Kyrgyz Republic.  Additionally,  the lower levels of
goodness-of-fit  for the FSU countries noted above suggest that  a  binary dependent
-variable  (poor/non-poor)  estimated  by probit techniques  might perform better and would
provide  valuable  information  about some of the variables  included. In this sense,  lack of
consistency  between  the probit and OLS results would demonstrate  problems  either with
measurement  error or in specification.
The probit  results  in Table 15 suggest  an acceptable  fit, but not a particularly  good
one.  The model  serves  to predict correctly  the poverty status of about three-quarters  of
Estonian  households,  but only 60-65 percent of Russian  and Kyrgyz Republic  households.
As was the case with the OLS results, not all coefficients  were found to be significantly
different  from zero at a 90 percent confidence  level,  and a small subset  of the coefficients
which were significant  in the OLS were not significant  in the probit (Estonia: primary
76education  and  inactive head;  Russia:  primary  education;  and  Kyrgyz Republic: two
education variables and unemployed head).  In Russia, the tenancy status of the household
was significant for the probit but not for the OLS.
Results of the probit are reported in Table 15 as the probability derivatives at the
mean levels of continuous variables, and for  a discrete  0 to  1 change for the  dummy
variables.  The estimation used  non-poor  as the  base  category,  so derivatives with  a
positive  sign  indicate an  increased  probability of  being  poor  and  derivatives with  a
negative sign pertain to reducing the chance of being poor.  Other than the four cases
reported  above where a variable was significant in OLS but not in the probit (or vice-
versa),  the results suggest that the determinants of poverty identified in the probit are
essentially the same as the determinants of household welfare discussed in the preceding
section.
77Table 15:  Poverty Equations  (Probit):  FSU Countries
Estonia  Kyrgyz  Republic  Russia
Probability  Standard  Probability  Standard  Probability  Standard
Derivatives  Error  Derivatives  Error  Derivatives  Error
Number  of children  0.056*  0.012  0.020*  0.008  0.065*  0.010
Number  of male  adults  0.050*  0.021  0.008  0.014  0.011  0.014
Numberoffemaleadults  0.013  0.018  -0.010  0.014  -0.006  0.013
Number  of elderly  0.037  0.022  0.003  0.026  -0.005  0.016
Education  of head: primary  0.045  0.023  0.001  0.037  0.032  0.023
Education  of head: vocational/technical  ...  ...  -0.027  0.036  -0.028  0.019
Education  of head: university  -0.149*  0.029  -0.059  0.036  -0.094*  0.023
Age  of head  0.003  0.003  -0.010*  0.005  -0.006*  0.003
Age  of head  squared  -0.000  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000  0.000
Female  head  0.077*  0.028  0.119*  0.036  0.066*  0.020
Household  owns  enterprise  -0.135*  0.022  -0.094*  0.025  -0.127*  0.023
Household  owns  land  -0.159*  0.022  -0.092*  0.025  0.010  0.018
Household  is renter  0.088*  0.019  -0.032  0.043  -0.046*  0.016
Share  of wages  in household  income  -0.277*  0.033  -0.104*  0.041  -0.184*  0.025
Number  of unemployed  in household  0.115*  0.025  ...  ...  0.137*  0.024
Head  is unemployed  ...  ...  0.036  0.044  ...  ...
Head  is inactive  0.046  0.030  0.014  0.039  0.074*  0.024
Location:  non-capital  city  0.154*  0.024  0.195*  0.039  0.187*  0.025
Location:  village  0.273*  0.032  0.266*  0.035  0.222*  0.030
Log-likelihood  -1504.8  -1241.5  -3201.8
Chi-squared  494.53*  136.75*  478.38
Prob  > chi-squared  0.000  0.000  0.000
% correct  predictions  72.6  61.5  65.0
Note: * Indicates significance  of the underlying  coefficient  at 90% level probability. Derivatives  are taken at the mean values of continuous
variables  or for discrete  change  of dummy  variables  from  0 to I.
78There are discrete quantitative differences in the coefficients estimated by the two
procedures,  which  is  as  expected,  since the  probit  equation  is  based  on  different
infornation  than  the  levels regression,  although the  rank  ordering  is  much the  same
(except  in Kyrgyz Republic).  For  example, in Estonia,  share  of  wages  in  household
income (increase of 33 percent) and location in a village (decline of 31 percent) had the
largest effects on household welfare.  In the probit, these two variables had the largest
effect on the probability of the household's being poor, with changes in probability of 28
percent for both, with the appropriate signs. The main exception to the consistency of  the
findings was for primary education of the household head, which was found to  reduce
household welfare by 7 percent  in the welfare regression but  was not  significant in the
probit regression.  Access to land was in fifth place for determining poverty but in eighth
place for  welfare.  Aside from this  minor reordering,  there  were  no  other  significant
changes.  The first four variables which were most significant for poverty were also the
most significant  for household welfare:  share of wages in household income, location in a
village, university education of head, and non-capital city location.
In Russia, two factors (renting one's home status and age of head) were associated
with poverty in the probit regressions but were not identified as contributing significantly
to  household welfare, while one factor  which did  reduce  household welfare  (primary
education for  household head) was not  significant for  poverty.  However,  these three
variables were all relatively unimportant-renting  reduced the risk of poverty less than 5
percentage points and age of head by less than one percentage point (the two lowest of the
significant variables for poverty), while primary education reduced  welfare by about  8
79percentage points (the lowest of all significant variables for welfare). More significantly,
the ranking of the first five variables remained the same for both  poverty and welfare:
rural, non-capital city, share of wages in household income, number of unemployed in
household, and enterprise ownership.
In Kyrgyz Republic, the picture is less clear.  The locational factors which were
most significant for household welfare were  also for  poverty (rural and non-capital city
respectively), but the probit found that female headship was in third place (increasing the
risk of poverty by 12 percentage points while in the OLS, it was in fifth place (reducing
welfare by 19 percent).  The correspondence unraveled further for other factors.  In the
OLS,  land access  was third  most  important,  raising household  welfare  by  nearly 25
percent, but in the probit, land access was in sixth place and only reduced the chance of
poverty by approximately 9 percentage points.  The education variables which were found
to  be  significant  for  Kyrgyz  household  welfare  were  insignificant in  the  poverty
regressions, and the probit also did not identify an unemployed head as a risk factor for
poverty, although it was found to reduce household welfare by nearly 15 percent.
Aside from some of the rerankings in the Kyrgyz Republic, the overall pattern of
poverty  determinants  is  consistent  with  the  pattern  demonstrated  by  the  welfare
regressions. The findings represent a challenge for social assistance authorities in the FSU
countries, since the factors most significant for household welfare and poverty are ones
that are extremely difficult to  change in the short-run:  location and share of wages in
household  income.  Demographic  characteristics  (number of  children,  female-headed
households) were generally statistically significant, but only increased the risk of poverty
80slightly  (usually  under  10  percentage points)  and  less  than  reducing welfare
(10-20 percent).
Poverty  Gap Equations
Tobit estimates  for the right-censored  subsample  of poor households  are presented
in Table 16. As discussed  earlier,  this formulation  is essentially  equivalent  to estimating
the determinants  of the poverty gap, and the Tobit coefficients  can be compared to the
welfare regression  coefficients  estimated  by OLS over the full sample (Table 14).  This
comparison  is an informal  test of whether the parameters apply to  the entire welfare
distribution, and is clearly rejected for many of the variables, which have Tobit coefficients
sharply higher than in the OLS full sample estimate.
The welfare loss from living outside of the capital is dramatically larger for the
poor than overall in Russia and Kyrgyz Republic, suggesting that  rural poverty is more
much severe and other urban (non-capital) poverty a significant  problem.  Rural poverty is
also associated with a higher welfare loss to  the poor in Estonia,  although the welfare
differential  of location in a non-capital  city is virtually  the same for the poor as for the
general  population. The reduction  in welfare  of the poor to living  in a rural area is greater
than 60 percent in Russia and Kyrgyz Republic, and reaches nearly 40 percent in Estonia.
In the non-capital urban areas, the reduction of welfare of the poor is 52 percent in Russia
and 44 percent in Kyrgyz Republic, but only 19 percent in Estonia.  These findings suggest
81Table 16: Poverty Gap Equations (Tobit):  FSU Countries
Estonia  Kyrgyz  Republic  Russia
Dependent  Variable:  In (Expenditure  per  Parameter  Standard  Parameter  Standard  Parameter  Standard
Equivalent  Adult) Right-Censored  at Poverty  Estimates  Error  Estimates  Error  Estimates  Error
Line
Intercept  7.287*  0.122  -9.721*  0.249  1.124*  0.176
Number  of children  -0.075*  0.016  -0.058*  0.017  -0.145*  0.021
Number  of male adults  -0.060*  0.029  -0.034  0.030  -0.036  0.033
Number  of female  adults  0.004  0.024  0.032  0.029  0.038  0.030
Number  of elderly  -0.031  0.030  -0.028  0.054  -0.000  0.036
Education  of head: primary  -0.079*  0.030  0.028  0.078  -0.113*  0.052
Education  of head: vocationaltechnical  ...  ...  0.086  0.077  0.083*  0.044
Education  of head: university  0.265*  0.048  0.171*  0.079  0.256*  0.058
Age  of head  -0.003  0.005  0.019  0.011  0.017*  0.007
Age  of head  squared  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  °0.000*  0.000
Female  head  -0.090*  0.038  -0.229*  0.073  -0.182*  0.046
Household  owns  enterprise  0.173*  0.033  0.205*  0.056  0.316*  0.064
Household  owns  land  0.228*  0.030  0.304*  0.053  -0.058*  0.042
Household  is renter  -0.152*  0.027  0.115  0.095  0.052  0.039
Share of wages  in household  income  0.367*  0.046  0.289*  0.088  0.407*  0.058
Number  of unemployed  in household  -0.203*  0.032  ...  ...  -0.305*  0.053
Head is unemployed  ...  ...  -0.165*  0.093  ...  ...
Head is inactive  -0.112  0.040  -0.067  0.080  -0.193*  0.053
Location: non-capital  city  -0.188*  0.033  -0.440*  0.085  -0.523*  0.065
Location:  village  -0.366*  0.042  -0.615*  0.085  -0.637*  0.072
Log-likelihood  -1466.8  -1709.5  -4444.4
Chi-squared  542.6  172.66  555.9
Prob  > chi-squared  0.000  0.000  0.000
SER  0.506  0.918  0.968
Note: * Indicates  that coefficient  is significantly  different  from  zero  at 90%  confidence  level.
82the importance of developing a rural development & poverty reduction strategy, perhaps
centered around  land privatization which has moved very  slowly in most  of the FSU.
Preliminary findings for  Armenia strongly suggested  the  importance of  the  1992 land
privatization program  in  preventing  rural  poverty  (World  Bank,  1996a),  which  was
significantly  lower than urban poverty in Armenia during 1994,1s
In Russia, the household link to the labor market in terms of the share of wages in
household income followed locational factors as the third-most significant determinant of
welfare of the poor, as for the general population, but the welfare premium of maintaining
the  wage-labor  market  link  was  more  significant for  the  poor  (increasing  welfare
40 percent) than for the population at large (30 percent).  In Estonia, the link to the labor
market was identified as the largest determinant of overall welfare (increasing it by one-
third), and this was also true for the poorer half of the distribution.
In Kyrgyz Republic, the share of wages in household income and access to land
both had returns to the poor which were larger (29 and 30 percent) than to the general
population (20 and 25 percent).  This suggests that active participation in farming or the
official labor market  is  an  even more effective vehicle for  reducing poverty than for
increasing welfare overall.  Access to land also was more important for reducing poverty
'g  At the time of this writing, of the FSU countries, only Armenia had instituted a full-scale land privatization
program (1992) by which former state and collective  farms had been broken  up and all land holdings passed to
individuals. In the other  countries,  households  retained  access  to land through  their private  plots. Under Soviet
law, rural and even  urban households  were entitled  to a very  small  (less than 0.06 and 0.02 hectares  respectively)
plot of land. These land plots were passed from generation  to generation,  comprised  3 percent of arable Soviet
land, and produced  up to 25 percent of the gross output of (non-wheat)  agricultural  production.  (Gregory  and
Sta,  1990).
83(raised the welfare of the poor  23 percent) than for raising welfare generally (increased
welfare for the full sample about 16 percent) in Estonia.  Land access was not found to be
especially important  for  the  poor  in  Russia, although  it  was  significant in  the  Tobit
regressions, unlike the OLS findings, but  further interpretation is futile considering the
measurement problems associated with this variable for Russia.
Demographic characteristics tended to demonstrate approximately the same effect
on the welfare of the poor as on the welfare of the general population.  Female-headship
led to  a larger reduction of welfare among the poor  vis-a-vis the general population in
Russia and Kyrgyz Republic (18 and 23 versus 14 and 19 percent, respectively), but this
was not the case in Estonia where the level was essentially the same (poor 9, general 10
percent).
Lastly, education effects were found to be distinctly larger for the poor than the
non-poor, suggesting that retraining and supplemental educational programs could have a
distinct impact  on poverty  reduction,  although the  orders  of magnitude of  increasing
welfare of the poor through education (10-30 percent) are much lower than the impact of
rural location (60 percent).
Overall, the poverty gap equations demonstrate that although the returns to human
and  household  capital  are  higher for  the  poor  than  for  the  general  population,  the
overwhelming effect  of location presents a  significant challenge for  poverty reduction.
Without some sort of rural development strategy, and a corollary development strategy for
non-capital urban  areas in Russia and Kyrgyz Republic, it is difficult to  postulate  that
conventional human capital development strategies will have a sufficient effect on poverty
84reduction.  At the same time that these countries are faced with the daunting challenge of
rural and regional development, improved targeting of scarce social protection resources
is imperative. We turn to this issue in the next section.
5.  Means-Testing and Indicator-Based Targeting
In the previous section we explored the determinants of welfare and poverty, and
of  the  depth  of  poverty.  This  has  provided a  number  of useful  findings, especially
regarding the role of household assets and the link to the labor market, which can be used
in the design of poverty reduction programs-either  for the targeting of transfers, or in
active employment creation policies.  In  this  section,  we  try  to  answer  the  question
whether indicator targeting is a feasible modus operandi in such policies.  The indicators
considered are the economnic  and demographic household characteristics which we used as
regressors  in the models.  Indicator-targeting  is usefil  in  situations where  an  overall
means-test is difficult  to administer because it is costly and/or unreliable.
Indicator-based targeting is commonly used in East European and FSU countries
for certain components of the social safety net 19. Family allowances are allocated on the
basis  of  the  number of  children.  Eligibility for  social  assistance  often  relies on  a
combination of indicators pertaining to household size, ownership of durable goods (e.g.
car or  house), and employment status.  It  is generally not  known  how efficient such
targeting mechanisms are in correctly identifying  the poor.
9  For a discussion  of indicator-based  targeting  in other  regions,  see e.g. Grosh and Baker (1995) for Latin America
and Subbarao  et al. (1997)  for other  regions.
85This  can  be  checked  empirically using  the  welfare  or  poverty  equations  we
estimated in  the  previous  section, by  comparing  predicted  with  actual  values  of  the
dependent variable and calculating the percentage of correct predictions. Below we report
the  results  of  one  such  exercise,  based  on  an  expanded welfare  regression.  As  we
discussed in  Section 2, the expansion consists of adding variables for "official" income
(wages  and  social transfers)  and  for  ownership  of  household  durables.  Due  to  the
endogeneity of these variables, no causal interpretation should be given to the coefficients.
The purpose is  simply to  test  their predictive ability.  The model was estimated with
forward stepwise regression.
The  set  of  regressors-household  durables,  official  income,  demographic
household  characteristics, location, employment status-are  all fairly easily identifiable
indicators, of the sort that social workers could observe or ask about easily in the course
of a visit to a household to determine eligibility  for a transfer program.  How well do they
identify the poor?
A.  Eastern Europe
Table 17 shows,  for  the  three  East European  countries,  the  five and  ten  best
predictors and the results in terms of identifying correctly poor and non-poor households.
Overall, the results are  impressive:  the set  of 25-30  indicators included in the  model
correctly predicts poverty status in about 80 percent of the cases.  However, the model is
clearly much  better  in  identifying the  non-poor,  with  an  accuracy  of  90 percent  for
Bulgaria and 97 percent in the cases of Hungary and Poland.  For the poor, the results are
86much  worse, with no model reaching even 50 percent accuracy.  Clearly, this is inadequate
for real-life application.
Table 17:  Stepwise Targeting Regressions (All Observations)
East European Countries
Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland
Best Five Predictors
Color TV  --  Car  Washing machine
Education:  primary  Wage income  Number of children
Refrigerator  Color TV  Wage income
Car  Number of children  Car
Wage income  - Education:  primary  Number of male adults
% Correct Predictions
Poor  47.3  13.1  16.7
Non-poor  86.8  98.7  97.5
All  75.9  81.1  82.1
Second Best Five Predictors
Number of children  Renter  Social transfers
VCR  Number of unemployed  Household enterprise
Renter  Washing machine  Education:  university
Household enterprise  Education:  university  Number of unemployed
Number of male adults  Household enterprise  Number of female adults
% Correct Predictions
Poor  35.5  24.7  22.7
-Non-poor  92.3  97.2  96.7
All  76.6  82.4  82.6
All Variables - % Correct Predictions
Poor  45.4  30.7  24.8
Non-poor  90.8  96.6  97.0
All  78.3  83.1  83.2
Note:  Dependent  variable  is the  log  of  per equivalent  adult  expenditure.  The  regressors  are  the  same  as in the
welfare  and  poverty  regressions  with  the  addition  of  wage  and transfer  income  and consumer  durables.
87The results also show a remarkable robustness to the numbers of indicators used.
In the case of Poland,  the five best  predictors  do almost as good  a job  at identifying
poverty status as the full set.  In the case of Hungary, the best five variables identify the
non-poor almost perfectly (98.7 percent) but correct  identification of the poor improves
significantly,  from 13 percent to 31 percent, as more indicators are added.
It  is  noteworthy  that  several  household  durables  keep  coming  back  across
countries as good  predictors-car,  color TV, washing machine top  the list.  These are
clearly durables that identify the rich. Other  critical predictors are number of children,
ownership  of  a  household  enterprise,  level  of  wage  income,  renting  one's  home,
education, and number of unemployed in the household.
Given the apparent success of the model in identifying the rich, we undertook a
second  simulation.  Suppose that  the  variable list identified in Table 17 was  used to
correctly identify the upper half of the distribution, how well would the set of indicators
do to distinguish poor from non-poor households within the group  of household below
median welfare level?
The results in Table 18 show that the indicators are now quite able to  correctly
identify poor households:  success rates range from a low of 60 percent in Poland to a
high of 87  percent  in Bulgaria (actual poverty  rates  in the  below-median sample are
respectively 38 percent  and  55 percent).  This is a  very  respectable performance and
suggests that such approach is worth considering for real-life application.  Moreover, in
88Table 18:  Stepwise Targeting Regressions(Observations Below Median)
East European Countries
Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland
Best Five Predictors
Refrigerator  Color TV  Washing machine
Color TV  Renter  Number of children
Education-primary  Car  Wage income
Land ownership  Number of children  Social transfer income
Wage income  Wage income  Number of male adults
% Correct Predictions
Poor  87.8  69.1  53.7
Non-poor  27.3  62.0  76.1
All  60.6  64.8  67.6
Second Best Five Predictors
Number of male adults  Refrigerator  Car
Number of children  Number of unemployed  Color TV
Age of head of household  Education - primary  Number of unemployed
Car  Social transfer income  Number of elderly
Social transfer income  Sewing machine  Number of female adults
% Correct Predictions
Poor  87.3  65.6  57.8
Non-poor  32.5  70.9  74.8
All  62.7  68.8  68.3
All Variables  - % Correct Predictions
Poor  86.7  67.8  60.4
Non-poor  35.9  70.9  75.0
All  63.9  69.7  69.5
Note Dependent  variable  is the  log  of per  equivalent  adult  expenditure.  The  regressors  are  the same  as in the
welfare  and poverty  regressions  with  the addition  of wage  and transfer  income  and consumer  durables.
89Hungary and Bulgaria, the same level of correct identification of poor  households was
achieved with the five best predictors alone. 20 In Poland, going from five predictors to the
full set yields an improvement from 54 percent to 60 percent correct predictions for poor
households.
Interestingly, the set of predictors which emerges as the best is not that different
from those which came out of the estimation over the full sample.  Among durables, car
and  color  TV  are  still  the  best  identifiers.  Among  the  other  variables,  household
composition and official  income are now more to the fore.
In summary, this exercise illustrates that a fairly simple set of observable indicators
at the household level can be used to  correctly identify 90 percent or better of non-poor
households.  This could serve as a first-step screen to eliminate better-off households from
consideration in poverty-oriented programs.  In a second step, the same indicators can be
used  to  identify  the  poor  from  the  non-poor  in  the  remaining bottom  part  of  the
distribution.  Success rates in this exercise were in the 60-87 percent range which is far
better than what current social assistance systems in Eastern Europe  achieve.  Grootaert
(1995, 1997a) has documented leakage rates of 47 percent of households in Poland and
almost 90 percent in Hungary in the case of social assistance.
20  Note that adding variables  only ensures a better overal prediction  rate.  Predictions  for the poor or non-poor
separately  may actually go down.  This is the case e.g. for Bulgaria, where the best five predictors correctly
identify 87.8  percent of poor households,  but the full model identifies only 86.7  percent of poor households
correctly. Overall  prediction  rate however  rose  fom 60.6  percent to 63.9 percent.
90There is thus significant scope  to improve the targeting of social assistance and
other poverty-oriented programs, and the simulation reported here indicates that indicator-
based targeting can make a significant contribution.  Our results suggest also that the list
of indicators will need to  be  country-specific.  While our  results  are indicative of the
potential of indicator-based targeting, they are not  a blue print for practical application.
Specifically, results could undoubtedly be improved by testing alternative combinations of
variables and by modifying scoring procedures.  For example, the best predictors can be
given a greater weight than what the regression implicitly  gives them.  This would improve
results, and our findings must therefore be seen as a low-end estimate of the effectiveness
of indicator-based targeting to identify poor households.
a  Former Soviet Union
The regression  findings for  FSU  clearly suggested  a  link between welfare and
poverty and such easily identified household attributes as location, the number of children
and elderly members, and whether the household is female-headed.  Certain-  traits, such as
the link to  the  formal labor market  and  a  household  enterprise, were  associated with
higher levels of welfare.
Under the previous Soviet social welfare system, all benefits were categorical ones.
For  example, all males aged 60 and over received some sort of pension (regardless of
whether they continued to  work), which was also the case for all females aged 55 and
above.  Starting in 1992, all children under the age of  16 (or  18 if they were  full-time
students)  were  eligible for  a  general  child allowance.  Certain  categories of  people,
91particularly the disabled received diverse benefits, such as free or reduced-price utilities
and transportation services.
Since most of those who received such categorical benefits were demonstrated to
actually be  the  non-poor  (see  various  World Bank  poverty  assessments),  categorical
targeting received significant and warranted criticism from external and internal advisors
and policy makers. However, the problem with categorical targeting may have been in the
poor choice of categories more so than the idea of using an indicator or combination of
indicators (a proxy means test) to identify the poor.  The choice of categories was dictated
by political considerations-not  by a carefil study of who was poor and what determined
poverty.
In  this  section,  we  try  to  determine whether  a  combination of  indicators  can
identify the poor,  which in turn would provide the  necessary information for  effective
targeting of cash or in-kind benefits, or for active labor market policies.  The indicators
used  here  are  the  same  economic  and  demographic  variables  which  were  used  as
regressors in our previous models, with some additional variables.  In practice, in the FSU,
and  particularly  in  Russia  and  Ukraine,  increasingly benefits  are  being  awarded  to
applicants who meet a categorical filter and an income-test.  Typically, this means-test is
based only on official income.  As noted in the poverty profile section, in the FSU, official
income is a particularly poor predictor of household welfare, due to the pervasive informal
sector and the general unwillingness  of households to disclose such sensitive information.
Preliminary evidence from the housing allowance subsidy programs in Ukraine and
Russia, which are based on official income (wages plus transfer income) suggests that an
92official income-test has a very high error of exclusion (those who are actually poor are not
receiving  the  benefit).  Partly  this  originates  from  the  very  different  goal  of  these
prograns,  which is to  promote housing privatization, and partly it may originate from a
lack of consideration of other factors related to poverty which are not captured in official
income.
In order  to  improve means-testing where  it currently  exists,  and to  revise and
update the categorical approach overall, we estimate an expanded welfare equation with
variables added for  official income (wages  and  social transfers)  and  for ownership of
household durables.  The data in Table 19 shows that the proxy means test was able to
identify correctly the poverty/non-poverty status of approximately 65-75 percent  of the
population, with all three countries having better predictions for the non-poor than for the
poor.  Only about 60 percent (57-62) of the poor were identified correctly, but this still
represent  a  significant  improvement  over  the  previous  single-indicator/categorical
approach used to allocate benefits such as old-age pensions and student stipends. 2'
At first glance, the five best  predictors for the FSU  countries seem to  be more
related to  the non-poor  side of the spectrum (wage income,  car, color TV, household
business, university education, land ownership) as to  the  poor  (transfer income).  The
addition of the next five (best ten total) predictors shows a mixture of factors associated
21  Analysis  of individual  countries  (Russia,  Kyrgyz  Republic) in World  Bank poverty  assessments  and comparative
analyses  (Knumn,  Milanovic,  and Walton 1994) found  that in general, only  child allowances  were well-targeted
transfers  in FSU countries. All other  transfers  were regressive  or highly  regressive.
93Table 19:  Stepwise Targeting Regressions (All Observations)
Former Soviet Union
Estonia  Kyrgyz Republic  Russia
Best Five Predictors
Wage income  Wage income  Wage income
Car  Car  Transfer income
Color TV  Washing machine  Color TV
Higher education  Color TV  Refiigerator
Transfer income  Land ownership  Household enterprise
% Correct Predictions
Poor  53.3  57.4  56.4
Non-poor  75.7  67.0  76.2
All  70.3  63.6  68.9
Second Best Five Predictors
Stereo  Number of children  Inactive head
Household enterprise  Renter  Car
Number of unemployed  Household enterprise  Location: other urban
Inactive head  Location: rural  Location: rural
Number of children  Location: other urban  Sewing machine
% Correct Predictions
Poor  58.3  56.7  57.1
Non-poor  76.8  68.1  77.0
All  72.5  63.7  69.5
All  Variables  - % Correct  Predictions
Poor  61.9  57.1  56.9
Non-poor  77.1  68.6  75.5
All  74.5  64.0  68.9
Note: Dependent  variable is the log of per equivalent  adult expenditure.  The regressors  are the same  as in the
welfare  and poverty  regressions  with  the addition  of wage  and transfer income  and consumer  durables.
94with higher welfare (stereo, car, household enterprise)  as with low welfare (number of
children, transfer income, rural location, other urban  location,  number of unemployed,
inactive head).  This  addition does  little to  improve the fit, raising the overall correct
prediction rate only slightly (64-73 percent) and the rate for the poor a bit more (57-58
percent) than was observed by using only the five best predictors.  The fiull  model shows a
barely greater prediction accuracy.
Given the presence of-so  many variables associated with  the higher end  of the
welfare distribution and the higher identification rates for the non-poor, we undertook a
second simulation similar to-what was done for the East European countries, but we found
vastly different results.  If there was some way to  screen out  the upper  portion of the
distribution, how well would the proxy means test distinguish among the poor and non-
poor  in  the lower  half of the distribution?  For  the Eastern  European  simulation, we
assumed that the screen would correctly identify the upper half of the distribution, since
the identification rates for the non-poor were all above 90 percent.  Although this was a
reasonable assumption for Eastern Europe,  in the original expanded regression for the
FSU countries, only 70-80 percent of the non-poor were correctly identified, thus making
this assumption a bit more questionable. However, for consistency, we simply re-ran the
expanded welfare regression via forward  stepwise  regression  on  the  half of the  FSU
samples with welfare below the median.
The results in Table 20 demonstrate that such an assumed screen would somewhat
improve the identification of the poor in Estonia (from 62 percent to 66 percent correctly
identified) but  would improve the identification of the poor  much more in Russia and
95Kyrgyz Republic, increasing to 80 and 83 percent respectively.  Of course, there is a cost
to this-the  few non-poor which remained in the below-median sample were either poorly
identified (Estonia), extremely poorly identified (Russia), or virtually unidentified (Kyrgyz
Republic).  This suggests that  a proxy means test system could perform rather well in
Russia and Kyrgyz Republic, and acceptably well in Estonia,  provided that an effective
mechanism could be found to  screen out the upper portion of the welfare distribution.  In
all three cases even without the screen, the proxy means test would represent a significant
improvement over the old categorical approach.
Further, in all three countries, the five best predictors alone did as good a job in
identifying  the poor (Kyrgyz Republic, Russia) or almost as well (Estonia) as did the full
model, implying that only a few key data would be required for collection.  As in Eastern
Europe, the set of predictors which emerges as the best for identifying the poor (given that
the upper 50 percent of the distribution was screened out of consideration) is more or less
the same as which resulted from estimation over the full sample. Interestingly enough, for
Kyrgyz Republic, using  the  below-median observations  resulted  in  only  six variables
meeting the entry criteria for  the forward  stepwise regression:  land ownership, wage
income, car, motorcycle, renter status,  and washing machine.  For Russia and Estonia,
more than 10 variables entered into the forward stepwise specification. 22
22  Restricting  the observations  to those below  the median significantly  improved  identification  of the poor in Kyrgyz
Republic and Russia but worsened the  identification  of  the non-poor, which thus prompted an additional
experiment with other regressors, in an  ultimately futile attempt to improve the  predictions of household
consumption. Adding "kitchen  sink" variables like housing  amenities (hot water, central heating, etc.) and an
additional dunmny  variable for self-employed  household head, resulted in error rates which were virtually
identical  to those for the original  specification  for Estonia  and Kyrgyz  Republic  and which were only marginally
better (2-3  percent)  for Russia. This specification  was therefore  not further considered.
96Table 20: Stepwise Targeting Regressions (Observations Below Median)
Former Soviet Union
Estonia  Kyrgyz Republic'  Russia
Best Five Predictors
Wage income  Land ownership  Wage income
Transfer income  Wage income  Color TV
Color TV  Car  Transfer income
Inactive head  Motorcycle  Education: primary
Number of unemployed  Renter  Refrigerator
% Correct Predictions
Poor  64.2  83.0  79.6
Non-poor  54.3  0.0  22.4
All  63.7  82.0  73.1
Second Best Five Predictors
Land ownership  Washing machine'  Education: higher
Location: rural  Land ownership
Education: voc.-tech  Household enterprise
Car  Renter
Washing machine  Number of elderly
% Correct Predictions
Poor  65.4  83.1  79.6
Non-poor  63.1  9.5  22.2
All  65.2  81.5  73.0
All Variables  - % Correct Predictions
Poor  65.5  83.1  79.5
Non-poor  61.1  8.7  21.8
All  65.1  81.3  72.9
Note:  Dependent  variable  is the log of per equivalent  adult expenditure.  The regressors  are the same  as in the
welfare  and poverty  regressions  with the addition  of wage  and transfer  income and consumer  durables.
Only six variables  met the entry  criteria.
97Overall, the acceptability of the proxy means test for the FSU countries depends
on  the  reasonability  of  the  assumed  screening  device.  Unlike  in  Eastern  Europe,
90 percent or more of the non-poor can not be assumed to be removed from consideration
through  an inventory of their consumer durables and other factors.  Only about 70-80
percent of the non-poor could be removed at best in the FSU.  Once the non-poor are
removed from consideration, virtually the same information collected  could be  used to
further refine the identification of the poor and non-poor in the remaining portion of the
welfare  distribution,  resulting  in  identification rates  of  65-82  percent.  Although  the
potential of proxy-means testing in FSU is not quite as impressive as in Eastern Europe, it
could still be a significant  improvement over the existing system of categorical indicators,
which is plagued by very large leakage to the non-poor.
986.  Summary and Conclusions
Poverty  has  emerged  as  a  significant problem  in  the  transition  economies.
Although more widespread in the Former Soviet Union, much "transitional" poverty has
proved to be difficult to eradicate even in Eastem Europe.  The social protection systems
of the transition countries have been inadequate to meet the challenges of transition, being
both  poorly  targeted  and  costly.  Although the  open  incidence of  poverty increased
everywhere during the transition period, distinctly different patterns of poverty emerged
from the East European  experience than from  the  Former  Soviet Union.  In  general,
poverty correlates are more- sharply defined in Eastern Europe than in FSU, holding out
the potential for better targeting in Eastern Europe.
In  this  paper,  we  undertook  a  comparative  analysis of  poverty  in  three  East
European countries and three FSU countries.  We used the HEIDE data  set,  specially
constructed  for  that  purpose.  The analysis consisted of three  tasks:  a  profile of  the
incidence and  depth of poverty  using aggregate  poverty indexes (Section 3);  a  multi-
variate analysis of the determinants of poverty (Section 4); and an empirical evaluation of
the role of means testing  and indicator-based targeting in poverty  alleviation programs
(Section 5).
We also raised a number of methodological issues.  For the poverty profile, we
used  the  well-known  P-alpha  class  of  poverty  indexes,  disaggregated  along  relevant
socioeconomic and demographic dimensions.  We opted, however, for a relative poverty
line, rather than the more customary approach of absolute lines in cross-country research.
In doing so, we put the comparability of the poverty profile ahead of the comparability of
99the  headcount.  When countries  have significantly different  levels of  GDP,  the  same
absolute line would  cut-off from very small to very large proportions  of the population,
which are difficult  to disaggregate and compare in a meaningful way.
For  the multivariate analysis we took  note  of the  current  debate  over  welfare
regressions and binary poverty regressions as the main  analytic tool for poverty research,
but  we  argued  that  in  transition  economies both  are  needed  as  they  serve  different
purposes.  While welfare regresssions utilize the maximum available statistical information
on the dependent variable, they ignore measurement errors of the type typically present in
transition  economy databases.  In  our  results,  the  two  models  provided qualitatively
consistent answers on the significant determinants of poverty and welfare, but underlined
that some variables, such as education and productive assets, play different roles in escape
from poverty as opposed to determining position on the nonpoor segment of the welfare
distribution.
Likewise, our Tobit-based estimation of the poverty gap indicated that parameters
measuring the impact of household characteristics on welfare are often not the same for
the poor and nonpoor.  Many human and physical capital assets had higher returns for the
poor.  Locational disadvantages were also often larger for the poor than the population at
large.  Our results call for caution when relying on one single multivariate model to study
the correlates of poverty.  We would argue that the three models used here (OLS Welfare
Model, Probit Poverty Model, and Tobit Poverty Gap Model) constitute a useful. minimal
set to investigate the determinants of poverty.
100Using the criterion of two-thirds of household  expenditure  per equivalent  adult
(OECD equivalence  scale),  poverty  in Eastern  Europe was found to be significantly  lower
than in FSU countries. Hungary and Poland have the lowest poverty incidence  (21-23
percent)  and a poverty gap less than 15 percent of the poverty line. Bulgaria  is slightly
worse-off  with a poverty  rate of 26 percent  and a poverty  gap of 20 percent. Each of the
FSU countries exceeds those statistics  by far.  Estonia has a poverty incidence of 30
percent and  a poverty  gap of 20 percent. In Russia  and Kyrgyz  Republic,  the poverty  rate
is around 40 percent and  the poverty  gap is in the 25-30 percent range.
The profile  of poverty shows some common  aspects for Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet  Union  as well as pronounced  differences:
_  rural poverty  is higher than urban poverty; within urban areas, the capital city
has the lowest poverty (except in Hungary);  however, in the East European
capitals,  the poverty  gap was higher  than elsewhere  in the country.
- in Eastern  Europe,  there is a very strong correlation  between  poverty  incidence
and  the  number of  children in  the  household; in  the  FSU  this  is  less
pronounced,  except  in Russia;
>  single person household,  especially  elderly females, have very high poverty
rates (except  in Poland);  their poverty  is also more severe;
=  consistent with  this,  pensioner households have  above  average poverty
incidence  and  gap (except  in Poland);
101=>  however,  the highest poverty  rates are found among  people who have lost an
active or regular connection  with the labor market and live on social transfers
(other than pensions)  or other non-earned  income  as prime source of revenue;
their poverty rates can be as much as three times higher than the national
average, especially  if two or more household  members  are unemployed;  these
households  often absorbed the highest social cost of transition by failing  to
obtain  a regular  source of earnings;
the poverty  gap is remarkably  uniform  in East European  countries,  especially  in
Poland and Hungary, indicating  that social safety nets have prevented the
emergence  of deep  pockets of poverty. In the FSU, this is much less the case,
and frequently  those  with the highest  poverty  rate also have  the highest  poverty
gap;
=  the key role of labor market connections  should  not lead to the conclusion  that
there is no poverty among the working class.  Many have low education
(primary  education or less) or outdated vocational/technical  education, and
while poverty rates  are  low for workers, their sheer mass in  the  total
population  means  that the working  poor constitute  the largest  group of poor.
the connection  between education  and poverty suggests that only those with
special skills or university education succeed in escaping poverty in great
numbers,  thanks to demand for their skills  from the newly emerging private
sector.
102=> Last, the profile shows that there is a gender dimension  to  poverty in each
country. Female-headed  households  have higher  poverty incidence  and gap in
each of the six countries.
Without  wishing  to downplay  differences  across countries,  the common  aspects  in
this profile of poverty suggests  that there is a case to be made for a poverty alleviation
policy for the-  East Europe/FSU  region as a whole.  Lessons learned in one country are
likely to  have applicability  irrothers.  Priorities in targeting (children, elderly, low-
educated  workers, female-headed  households)  are similar  across countries  and the design
of targeted interventions  can benefit from region-wide experiences. Needless to  say,
social and cultural differences  are important,  and must be given  their due weight, even if
economic  behavior  and responses-are  similar.
The multivariate  analysis  has corroborated  the univariate  observations  from the
poverty profile, and made it possible  to  compare net effects, controlling for all other
factors, and identify  the highest  pay-off actions. Although  there is more variation  across
countries,  some  common  factors  have  emerged:
>  education plays a key role for welfare improvements. There is always a
significant  welfare penalty  to having  achieved only primary  education, and in
some countries (those most advanced in the transition process) the penalty
extends  to vocational  and technical  education  as well. Since it is not practical
to quickly  upgrade education  and/or retrain huge segments  of the population,
this aspect of poverty  will remain  a long-term  challenge.
103>  ownership  of a household  enterprise  has very high payoffs  in several  countries,
often increasing  household  welfare  by 20-30 percent. Returns are even higher
for  the  poor.  Unquestionably, programs of  information, micro-credit,
marketing,  small business incubators,  etc.  to  help  entrepreneurs and
prospective entrepreneurs  must take center stage in poverty alleviation  in
Eastem Europe and FSU. There is every reason  to believe  that in the short- to
medium-term,  employment  creation  will be much higher in the informal  sector
than in the formal  (often still-to-be  privatized)  sector.
- age and gender effects are of concern in some countries (Bulgaria,  Kyrgyz
Republic)  but not in others  like Poland  where the pension  system  has adequate
reach.  This is primarily  an issue of re-targeting pensions and other social
transfers,  or of increasing  the level of the minimum  pension  (paid primarily  to
women  who lack adequate  work-tenure  to receive  higher  old-age pensions),  at
the expense  of compressing  the rest of the pension  distribution.
The multivariate  analysis  has confirmned  the importance  of household  composition,
especially  the number  of children:  households  do not succeed  in maintaining  their welfare
levels when the number of children increases.  This calls for child-oriented  transfer
programs  to move away  from general  entitlements  to means-tested  or proxy means-tested
programs.
In the final section  of this paper, we undertook an assessment  of the potential  of
proxy means-testing  and indicator-targeting  for poverty alleviation programs such as
social assistance. We used a set of easily  identifiable  household  characteristics,  including
104demographic  composition,  education, employment  status, location, household durables
and  official income to  estimate a  forward stepwise regression to  identify the  best
predictors. The results for Eastern  Europe were more promising  than for FSU. In a first
run, we could successfully  identify  more than 90 percent of nonpoor households,  using a
set of 25-30 indicators. A surprising  but potentially  very important  result was that this
accuracy  was only marginally  reduced when the best 5 or 10 predictors  were used.  In a
second run, limited  to the lowest half of the distribution  (assuming  that the first run had
successfully  identified  households  in the top half),  we correctly  identified  60-87 percent of
the poor.  Again, the loss in accuracy was small when using only the best 5 or  10
predictors. These are very respectable  results  and suggest  that such an approach  is worth
considering  for real-life  application.
In the FSU countries,  the first-stage  correct identification  of non-poor  households
achieved  only 69-77 percent, and in the second stage the poor were correctly predicted
65-83 percent of the time.  These results are still  far better than the systems currently  in
place in the FSU countries. In Russia, experiments  are currently  being undertaken  with
indicator-targeting  to  see how alternative  formulas and sets of indicators can improve
correct identification  of needy social  assistance  recipients.
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110Statistical  Annexes
Annex  1: Means  and Standard  Deviations  of Variables  (East  European  Countries)
Bulgaria  Hungary  Poland
Mean  Standard  Mean  -Standard  Mean  Standard
Deviation'  'Deviation  Deviation
Household  size  2.92  1.56  2.78  1.33  3.13  1.61
Number  of children  0.47  0.80  0.58  0.90  0.75  1.06
Number  of male adults  0.98  0.84  0,90  0.74  1.00  0.78
Number  of female  adults  1.02  0.79  0.97  0.67  1.09  0.69
Number  of elderly  0.45  0.66  0.33  0.59  0.28  0.56
Ageofheadofhousehold  55.04  15.31  49.2  16.3  48.7  14.8
Age  of head  squared  3264.2  1694.4.  2682.1  1703.9  2594.3  1537.5
Female  head  of household  0.21  0.41  0.31  0.46  0.35  0.48
Head with primary  education  0.47  0.50  0.43  0.49  0.33  0.47
Head  with secondary  education  0.31  0.46  0.22  0.41  0.26  0.44
Head  with vocational/technical  education  0.07  0.26  0.24  0.43  0.32  0.46
Headwithuniversityeducation  0.15  0.35  0.11  0.32  0.10  0.30
Tenancy  status: renter  0.07  0.26  0.17  0.38  0.45  0.50
Household  enterprise  ownership  0.05  0.21  0.08  0.27  0.06  0.23
Land  ownership  0.40  0.49  - - 0.50  0.50
Share of wages  in total household  income  0.29  0.32  0.40  0.36  0.38  0.39
Number  of unemployed  household  members  - - 0.21  0.49  0.16  0.42
Unemployed  head  of household  - - 0.05  0.22  0.02  0.15
Inactive  head  of household  - - 0.36  0.48  0.35  0.48
Capital  city  0.15  0.36  0.22  0.41  0.07  0.26
Other city  0.52  0.50  0.41  0.49  0.60  0.49
Rural areas  0.33  0.47  0.37  0.48  0.33  0.47
111Annex 2:  Means and  Standard  Deviations of Variables  (FSU Countries)
Estonia  Russia  Kyrgyz
Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard
Deviation  Deviation  Deviation
Household size  2.41  1.34  2.75  1.39  4.93  2.76
Number of children  0.51  0.85  0.59  0.86  1.82  1.70
Number of male adults  0.70  0.68  0.82  0.72  1.39  1.07
Number of female adults  0.88  0.65  0.98  0.68  1.48  1.01
Number of elderly  0.32  0.58  0.35  0.60  0.24  0.50
Ageofheadofhousehold  48.10  16.41  48.4  15.75  41.16  14.00
Age of head squared  2582.5  1656.8  2590.7  1620.4  1889.6  1304.5
Female head of household  0.36  0.48  0.29  0.46  0.18  0.38
Head with primary education  0.28  0.45  0.28  0.45  0.33  0.47
Head with secondary education 1/  0.58  0.49  0.34  0.47  0.24  0.43
Head with vocationaUtechnical  education 1/  ...  ...  0.16  0.37  0.25  0.43
Head with university education  0.13  0.34  0.25  0.43  0.18  0.38
Tenancy status:  renter  0.50  0.50  0.55  0.50  0.08  0.27
Household enterprise ownership  0.22  0.41  0.08  0.28  0.32  0.47
Land ownership  0.53  0.50  0.23  0.42  0.58  0.49
Share of wages in total household income  0.45  0.39  0.43  0.39  0.27  0.33
Number of unemployed household members  0.11  0.37  0.08  0.30  ..  ..
Unemployed  head of household  ...  ...  ...  ...  0.08  0.27
Inactive head of household  0.32  0.47  0.34  0.47  0.22  0.42
Capital city  0.47  0.50  0.61  0.49  0.26  0.44
Other city  0.26  0.44  0.28  0.45  0.59  0.49
Rural areas  0.27  0.44  0.10  0.31  0.17  0.37
Notes:
1/  It was not possible  to separate  household  heads  with vocational-technical  education  from heads  with general  secondary  education  in Estonia,  due to lack of
comparability  between  definitions  used in the Estonian  survey  and those used in other  countries.
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